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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
I Aim 
In this dissertation, the issue that is considered is whether or not the 
provisions of section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Admiralty 
Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 1983 ('the Act') constitute an arbitrary 
deprivation of a minority shareholder's property because they permit the 
deprivation of minority shareholder's property interests purely on the basis 
of common control by the majority shareholder.1 
II Background 
Section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act permits a creditor 
to enforce its maritime claim by arresting a ship other than the ship in 
respect of which the creditor has a maritime lien or a claim in personam 
even where the associated ship2 is owned by a different juristic person. In 
effect, where the majority shareholder controls both the guilty (referred to 
4 
1 See MJD Wallis The Associated Ship & South African Admiralty Jurisdiction (2012) (Wallis) at 
266. He illustrates this concern by providing the following example: 'there is a situation where 
the ship concerned and the associated ship are owned by companies, both of which are 
controlled by the same individual, but where each company has minority shareholders and these 
are not common to both. In simple terms, the shares in company A, that owns the ship 
concerned, are owned by X andY with X being the controlling shareholder. The shares in 
company B, that owns the associated ship, are owned by X and Z with X again being the 
controlling shareholder. The constitutional question is whether it is open to Z in that case to 
complain that permitting arrest of the associated ship in respect of the debts arising from the 
operation of the ship concerned, involves arbitrary deprivation of his or her property interest in 
company B?' 
2 Section 3(7)(a) ofthe Act defines an associated ship as 'a ship, other than the ship in respect 
of which the maritime claim arose: 
(i) 
owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a person who controlled the company 
which owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose; or 
owned, at the time when the action is commenced, by a company which is controiied by a 
person who owned the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the ship 
concerned, when the maritime claim arose. 
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (a): 
(i) ships shall be deemed to be owned by the same persons if the majority in number of, or 
of voting rights in respect of, or the greater part, in value of, the shares in the ships are owned 
by the same persons; 
(ii) a person shall be deemed to cohtrol a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to 
control the company; a company includes any other juristic person and anybody of persons, 
irrespective of whether or not any interest therein consists of shares ... .'. 
as the 'concerned') ship-owning company and the associated ship-owning 
company at the relevant time, association is established and consequently 
the associated ship is liable to be arrested. It matters not that a minority 
shareholder in the associated ship company has no interest in the 
concerned ship company nor knowledge of the claim. This gives rise to a 
number of possible constitutional questions which relate inter alia to the 
right to property. 
5 
This dissertation aims to examine whether the provisions of the Act read 
together substantively3 infringe section 25(1) of the Constitution4 by reviewing 
the primary Constitutional Court decisions relating to section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, namely, First National Bank of South Africa Ltd f/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) ('FNB')5 and Mkontwana v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEG, 
Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and Others 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) 
(' Mkontwana'). Although the facts of these cases are different from those that 
arise in an associated ship arrest, the underlying principles established by the 
Court are central to analysing whether section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 
3(7)(b)(i) of the Act constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property with respect 
to minority shareholders. 
In the FNB case the Court stated the following (in relation to the 
deprivation enabled by section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964): 
'Here the end sought to be achieved by the deprivation is to exact payment 
for a customs debt. This is a legitimate and important legislative purpose, 
essential for the financial well-being of the country and in the interest of all 
3 !n the FNB case, the Court held that deprivation will be arbitrary if it is without 'sufficient 
reason' or procedurally unfair. This dissertation will consider only the substantive elements that 
may infringe section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5 AJ van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed (2011) (Van der Walt) at 8. He states: 
'Arguably the most significant development in constitutional property law after 1994 was the 
Constitutional Court's FNB decision in 2002. That decision sketched out the way forward as far 
as the interpretation of section 25 is concerned, especially with regard to deprivation of 
property.' 
its inhabitants. Section 114, however, casts the net far too wide ... it 
sanctions total deprivation of a person's property under circumstances 
where (a) such a person has no connection with the transaction giving rise 
to the customs debt; and (b) where such person has not transacted with or 
placed the customs debtor in possession of the property under 
circumstances that have induced the Commissioner to act to his detriment 
in relation to the incurring of the customs debt. In the absence of any such 
relevant nexus, no sufficient reason exists for s 114 to deprive persons 
other than the customs debtor of their goods. Such deprivation is 
accordingly arbitrary for the purpose of s 25(1) and consequently a 
limitation (infringement) of such person's rights.'6 (Emphasis added) 
6 
On the basis of this reasoning, the dissertation aims to consider whether 
section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) infringes minority shareholders' 
property interests for the following reasons: the provisions are too expansive in 
that they too 'cast the net far too wide' by not limiting their application only to 
instances where all the shares are owned and controlled by the same person; 
they sanction total deprivation of a person's property in circumstances where (a) 
such a person may have no connection with the transaction giving rise to the 
maritime claim; (b) such person has not transacted with the claimant and 
therefore lacks the necessary nexus to the wrongdoing, and (c) there are less 
restrictive means to give effect to the objectives of the Act. 
Based on the Court's reasoning in the Mkontwana case it will consider 
whether the contrary is not equally persuasive by arguing that the provisions do 
not infringe minority shareholders' property rights on the grounds that (a) the 
purpose of section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) is legitimate and 
compelling because it seeks to protect creditors from unscrupulous debtors in 
the context of a trade with particular international arrangements that place 
reliance on admiralty law being governed as a separate and distinct jurisdiction; 
(b) the law provides a 'sufficient reason' for the deprivation; (c) there exists a 
clear relationship between the associated ship and the debt occasioned by the 
6 Vander Walt op cit (n 5) 247. 
concerned ship and ·between the debt and the minority shareholder of the 
property because through its shareholding in the ship-owning company, the 
minority shareholder knowingly assumes the risks associated with minority 
shareholding in the company; and (d) there are measures that minority 
shareholders could and ought to put in place to guard them against loss 
occasioned through the arrest of the associated ship. 
Given that it is possible that there are two opposing outcomes that could 
be reached in addressing the question posed in this dissertation, I will further 
consider whether, if it is found that the provision infringes section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, it could nevertheless be protected by section 36(1) of the 
limitations clause in the Constitution. 
7 
In concluding, I will contend that although there are arguments that can be 
made persuasively both in defence of and against the constitutionality of the 
relevant provisions in the Act, it is clear that any determination by a Court will 
require a careful balancing of competing interests not only in the context of 
property rights but also in the context of admiralty law. 
Ill Structure 
In order to arrive at this conclusion, the chapters have been structured in the 
sequence set out below. In chapter 2 the relevant associated ship provisions 
contained in the Act will be examined with a view to understanding the context 
of the provisions and the purpose behind the legislation. The chapter will also 
outline how the Constitutional Court approaches interpretation to legislation. 
Chapter 3 will consider all the relevant general elements of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. In chapter 4, I shall apply the approach adopted by the Court in 
FNB and refined in Mkontwana to the relevant provisions of the Act to assess 
whether the provisions infringe section 25(1) of the Constitution. In chapter 5, 
the arguments for and against the constitutionality of the provisions will be 
examined. In chapter 6 I reflect on whether the potential limitation of the 
property right brought about by the Act is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom in terms 
of section 36(1) of the Constitution. In so doing, I consider whether there are 
'Jess restrictive means' to achieve the objectives of the Act. To contextualise 
the outcome of the analysis, chapter 7 reflects on the current debates in 
international jurisdictions regarding provisions similar to the associated ship 
provisions contained in the Act. In chapter 8, I conclude by consolidating my 
primary findings on the question of constitutionality by drawing together my 
analysis of the Constitution, the Act, court decisions, published articles and 
textbooks relating to the subject matter of this dissertation. While there is no 
definitive answer to the enquiry conducted in this dissertation, it is submitted 
that it is likely that it will be found that the provisions in the Act in their current 
form do not pass Constitutional muster. 
8 
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CHAPTER 2 THE ASSOCIATED SHIP PROVISIONS 
I Aim 
The aim of this chapter is to examine more closely the associated ship 
provisions contained in the Act, particularly section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 
3(7)(b)(i) of the Act, to establish the context of the provisions and the purpose 
behind the legislation. The chapter also aims to consider the Constitutional 
Court's approach to interpreting legislation and the application of that approach 
to relevant provisions of the Act. 
II The Provisions 
(a) The context of the associated ship provisions 
Hare7 states that one of the fundamental cornerstones of South Africa's 
admiralty jurisdiction is the statutory right to bring a 'suit in rem', otherwise 
known as an action in rem. It is a powerful remedy that enables a party to arrest 
another's property before judgment is obtained against the owner of the 
property and can be effected without notice to the owner. Section 3(4) of the 
Act provides that it may be enforced if the claimant has a maritime lien8 over the 
property or if the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the 
claimant in an action in personam. Hofmeyr9 states that although it was 
historically limited to the 'guilty' property only, its reach was extended as a result 
of maritime creditors being frustrated by entities that could deliberately 
circumvent its application by keeping away from ports where they were 'guilty' of 
transgressions.10 
7 J Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa, 2ed (2009) (Hare) 33. 
6 The Act does not define maritime liens. South African iaw is based on English iaw as at 
November 1983, which encompassed the following as maritime liens - collision, salvage, 
seamen's wages, master's wages and disbursements and bottomry or respondentia bonds. 
9 G Hofmeyr Admiralty Jurisdiction: Law and Practice in South Africa 2ed (2012) (Hofmeyr) 133. 
10 See also William Tetley 'Arrest, Attachment and Related Maritime Law Procedures (1999) 73 
Tul. L. Rev 1895, where he states: 'Pre-judgement security is of the highest importance to the 
maritime creditor, who always faces the threat of being unable to recover his debt from an 
impecunious or unscrupulous debtor, if the debtor's ship- the main asset on which so many 
maritime creditors depend in extending credit- should sail away without the debt having been 
paid.' 
10 
The Legislature addressed the concern by providing that the action in rem 
could be brought by the arrest of an associated ship instead of the ship in 
respect of which the maritime claim arose (the concerned ship}. The provisions 
in the Act allow for arrests of ships connected not only by common ownership, 
but also by common control. In bringing an application to arrest an associated 
ship, the onus is on the claimant, who is required to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that the ship they seek to arrest or attach is an associated ship of 
the concerned ship. South African courts largely draw inferences on the basis 
of the information provided by the parties as to whether the association exists. 
The courts will look to whether there was common ownership and common 
control of the concerned ship and the associated ship at the time that the claim 
arose and at the time that the claimant seeks to enforce its claims. 
(b) Section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with Section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act 
Section 3(7)(a)(ii) of the Act refers to an associated ship as one owned at the 
time at which the action commences by the person who controlled the company 
which owned the concerned ship when the maritime claim arose. Section 
3(7)(b)(i) of the Act provides that ownership shall be deemed if the majority in 
number of shares or voting rights, or value in shares in the ship, are owned by 
the same persons. In shipping law,11 a legal fiction exists that a ship is divided 
into 64 shares, which would mean that the majority own at least 33 shares. 
Wallis indicates that the key issue to be determined in applying the 
provision relates to the 'person in whom the power of control vests' .12 If the 
same person controls both companies at the relevant time, association is 
established, which he argues effectively ignores the presence of the minority 
shareholders. He states: 
'As the section is now solely concerned with control of the company, it 
disregards the position of persons holding minority interests in the 
company, whether one is dealing with the ship concerned or an associated 
ship. Accordingly, if A controls two ship-owning companies at times 
11 Ship Registration Act 58 of 1998. 
12 Wallis op cit (n1) 203. 
relevant for consideration of the question of association it will not matter that 
a minority shareholder in the company owning the associated ship has no 
interest in the company owning the shop concerned. Such a person can 
now clearly be deprived of his or her interest in the associated ship under 
the new provision notwithstanding that they have no connection with or 
responsibility for the default by the ship concerned. The effect of this 
change is to simplify the task of the arresting creditor and to extend the 
scope of the jurisdiction ... The effect of rendering the presence of minority 
shareholders irrelevant is probably to extend the scope for associated ship 
arrests.' 13 
Ill The Purpose of the Associated Ship Provisions 
Different views have been expressed by legal commentators on the reason 
for the inclusion of the associated ship provisions in the Act. 14 
Some commentators argue that it was essentially included as an extension 
of the 'sister-ship' provisions. 15 The sister-ship provisions contained in the 
International Convention relating to the Arrest of Sea Going Ships 
(Brussels Convention) of 1952 (the 'Arrest Convention') arose out of a 
concern that because actions in rem could be instituted only against 'guilty' 
ships, maritime debtors could avoid their legal obligations by simply 
staying away from ports where they were guilty of transgressions.16 The 
sister-ship provisions allowed a claimant to arrest either the ship in respect 
of which it had a maritime claim (the ship concerned) or any other ship 
owned at the time of enforcement of the claim by the person who was the 
owner of the ship concerned at the time the maritime claim arose. It 
13 Wallis op cit (n1) 146. 
14 The origin of the arrests preceding the Act falls outside the scope of the dissertation. See H 
Staniland 'The arrest of the associated ship in South Africa: lifting the corporate veil too high' 
(1996-1997) 9 USF Maritime Law Joumal405; Hofmeyrop cit (n9) 133 and Wallis op cit (n1) 
chap4. 
11 
15 Bulkship Union SA v Qannas Shipping Co Ltd & Another 2010 (1) SA 53 (SCA) at para 22; 
See further Hofmeyr op cit (n9) 134. 
16 See The Jade, The Eschersheim: Owners of the Ship Jade, Owners of Cargo lately laden on 
board the Motor Vessel Erkowit v Owners of the Ship Escherheim [1976] 1 All ER 920 (HL) at 
923 and The Owners of the Motor Vessel Monte Unlia v Owners of the Ships Banco and Others 
(The Banco) [1971) 1 ALL ER 524 (PDA and CA) at 151. 
provided that ships are deemed to be in the same ownership when all the 
shares in the ship are owned by the same person.17 1n practice, however, 
the provisions were ineffective because they were easily circumvented 
through the creation of 'single-ship' companies.18 In South Africa, the view 
that the associated ship provisions were in response to this perceived 
shortcoming in the sister-ship provisions was generally accepted by the 
legal fraternity.19 Hare states as follows: 
'A maritime claim can be a debt collector's nightmare. The persona of the 
debtor is in all likelihood a shell company registered in an obscure 
jurisdiction with its sole asset a ship that tramps the jurisdictions of the 
maritime world . . . Exacerbating the precariousness of the creditor's 
situation is the comparatively modern practice of the 'one ship' operation ... 
By the time of the drafting of the South African Admiralty Act, the "brass-
plate" shipowning company was the norm, and it was rare for the sister ship 
provisions of the Arrest Convention to be of any use whatever to claimants. 
South Africa adopted an innovative approach to sister ship arrest ... '20 
Bradfield supports this view by stating: 
'Mindful of this practice of establishing "one-ship" companies, generally as 
subsidiaries of a parent company that was effectively the owner of a fleet, 
as a means of circumventing the "sister'' ship provisions, the South African 
legislature adopted the notion of an "associated ship" where the link 
between the ships could also be established through common control rather 
than being restricted to common ownership, as was the case with the sister 
ship provisions.'21 
Staniland further comments that: 
17 See article 3(2) of the Arrest Convention. 
18 Hofmeyrop cit (n9) 133 
19 See South African Law Commission Discussion Paper (Project 32) Report on the Review of 
the Law of Admiralty, 13 September 1982 at 14. 
20 Hare op cit (n7) 103. 
21 G Bradfield 'Guilt by association in South African admiralty law' [2005) LMCLQ 234 at 238. 
12 
'At the time of their introduction, there was a discernible tendency by the 
law reformers to support the introduction of provisions on the ground that 
they merely constituted extensions of existing rights and remedies.'22 
13 
However, not all commentators are in agreement that this is the justification for 
the associated ship provisions. The notion is rejected by Wallis, who states: 
'Where it is sought to justify the associated ship arrest merely on grounds 
that its purpose is to align South African maritime jurisprudence with the 
provisions of the Arrest Convention, whilst addressing by way of extension 
a problem occasioned by attempts on the part of ship owners to avoid the 
sister ship arrest provided for in the Convention, it can be demonstrated that 
this is fallacious. The single ship company was no novelty when the Arrest 
Convention was concluded and, even more importantly, there is almost 
nothing to suggest that it has burgeoned in the way that it has, as a means 
to avoid the sister ship arrest.'23 
Wallis argues that an extension of the Arrest Convention provision would 
have been to widen the arrest provisions against any of the maritime debtor's 
property. What the associated ship provisions in the Act did was to introduce a 
completely new and different basis for liability by permitting the arrest of a 
different entity. In the Act, liability attaches not on the basis of ownership of the 
concerned ship or because of the arrest of property belonging to the debtor but 
on the basis of common control of ships or companies (or other corporate 
entities) which own the ships. As Wallis notes, there are fairly logical reasons 
why a company would want to structure its ownership in such a fashion .24 It 
could, and should, not therefore have been a legitimate underlying intention of 
the Legislature to 'outlaw' such ownership structures. Furthermore, the 
22 Staniland op cit (n14) 417. 
23 Wallis op cit (n1} 276. 
24 The commercial incentives for ship-owners to operate fleets of ships by structuring them as 
individual one-ship companies are highlighted by Wallis. He states that it may be a requirement 
of the banks that are financing the fleet who may insist on it to secure their own lending by way 
of cross-guarantees or personal guarantees. It may also be necessary so that they limit the 
number of creditors that can claim against the company particularly those that may rank higher 
than a mortgage in instances of insolvency. See Wallis op cit (n1) 277_ 
14 
pronouncements by the Minister of Justice that the associated ship provisions 
were intended to allow for lifting the corporate veil in instances of fraud25 appear 
to be misguided because it is not a requirement that fraud or dishonesty or 
improper conduct be alleged to invoke the provisions. 
Wallis raises two other possibilities to justify the existence of the 
associated ship provisions. The first relates to the theory that the associated 
ship provisions were incorporated into the Act with the aim of increasing South 
Africa's attractiveness as a maritime jurisdiction. It is a contextual factor that 
might add texture to this analysis as there is evidence that this was a major 
consideration of the drafters and legal fraternity when drafting the provisions. 
He argues that when the Act was being debated, it was clear that fewer sister 
ships existed (probably as a means of circumventing the legislation) and that 
sister-ship arrest provisions as provided for in the Arrest Convention would 
prove to be ineffectual. The inclusion of the sister-ship provisions would not 
provide an opportunity to develop South Africa as a 'desirable maritime 
jurisdiction'. At the time of drafting the Act, the protection that the country 
offered to maritime creditors was no different from that offered elsewhere in the 
world. It was becoming a political outcast in international politics and its location 
was not suitable to its becoming an international maritime trade litigation centre. 
In order for South Africa to become 'an attractive maritime jurisdiction', it needed 
a wider basis for creditors to pursue and secure their claims, and the most 
apparent way to achieve this was to find a means of attacking 'the practice of 
operating a single fleet ... by means of a number of vessels owned by one-ship 
company[ies]' 26 
25 Staniland op cit (n14) 410. Staniland further comments that the Minister of Justice's 
statements in the House of Assembly Debate, Hansard, 11 August 1983, Col 1172, which were 
as follows: 'Although the principles of sanctity of separate corporate personality of a company 
distinct from its members was enshrined in Salomon v Salomon and Co, our Courts should brush 
aside the veil of corporate separate personality time and again where fraudulent use Is 
made of the fiction of legal personality' reflects the vi.ew that the introduction of the provision was 
simply an extension of a South African company law principle.' (Emphasis added.) 
26 Wallis op cit (n1) 66; See further Hofmeyrop cit (n9) 18 para Vll.6. 
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Given Wallis's evidence as to why this was a key consideration underlying 
the more expansive associated ship jurisdiction (as opposed to the reasoning 
that it was simply an extension of the sister-ship provisions in the Arrest 
Convention) I am persuaded that it the aim of making South Africa an attractive 
maritime jurisdiction was a primary reason for the inclusion of the provisions. 
This is particularly concerning when one has regard to the extension of the 
ambit of jurisdiction by the amendment to the provisions in 1992 and the 
inclusion of section 5(3) in the Act.27 I deal with these in turn below. 
(a) The 1992 Amendment 
When one considers the current section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of 
the Act, it is clear that this was a significant shift from the previous provisions. 
In Dole Fresh Fruit International Limited v MV Kapetan Leonidas,28 the court 
considered the previous wording of the associated ship provisions, which stated 
that the meaning of 'shares' in section 3(7)(a)(ii) referred to all the shares in the 
company on the basis that the: 
'legislature could never have intended that a person owning shares in the 
company which owns the alleged associated ship, but who is a stranger to 
the company which owns the ship in respect of which the maritime claim 
arose, should be deprived of his interest by its arrest as an associated 
ship'.29 
This decision was made on the basis of the provisions before the 
amendment affected in 1992. One can also have regard to the views of Marais 
JA in the Belfry Marine Limited v Palm Base Maritime SON BHD 1999 (3) SA 
1083 (SCA) (the 'Heavy Metal' case), where, in dealing with the relevant 
sections of the Act, he states that: 
'The purpose of the provision does not create a fiction which could place 
innocent third parties in jeopardy of having their ships arrested to secure 
27 See the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 1992. 
28 1995 (3) SA 112 (A). 
29 At 119 B-0. 
payment of claims brought against persons or ships of whose existence 
they were quite oblivious. That would be tantamount to naked confiscation 
without compensation a purpose which one shies away from attributing to 
the Legislature unless that is unmistakenly what it intended.'30 
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In my view, the comment reflects an interpretation of the Act that is in 
compliance with the Constitution. The provisions were specifically amended to 
extend their application to situations where all the shares were not owned by the 
same person.31 Similarly, when one considers section 5(3) of the Act, it raises 
questions about the true justification for the provisions in the Act. It provides 
that in addition to effecting an arrest to commence an action in rem, an 
associated ship can also be arrested for the purpose of providing security. 
Section 5(3) of the Act entitles the Court at the instance of any interested party 
to arrest property owned by a peregrinus as security for a maritime claim 
pending in South Africa or in a foreign jurisdiction, which claim may be based on 
a foreign cause of action and is subject to foreign law. The claimant is not 
required to convince the Court that he has commenced proceedings. 32 All that 
is required is that he shows that proceedings are being contemplated. 33 As 
Hofmeyr states: 
'This procedure, being a claim for security, is a separate and ancillary issue 
between the parties, collateral to and not directly affecting the main dispute. 
The section represents a far-reaching innovation. It extends to proceedings 
30 The Heavy Metal at 1112 1-J. In the case, this statement is made in relation to locating where 
the power of control really lies. The court stated that the dominance of ownership (where there is 
divided ownership}; the dominance of control and the dominance in the value of shares was 
'considered to be a justification for equating the situations' to full ownership in the concerned or 
associated ship; see at para 8 of Marais JA's judgment. The constitutionality of the provision in 
relation to minority shareholders was therefore not the subject matter of the case but in my view 
the same reasoning must be applied in relation to minority shareholders. 
31 Wallis op cit (n1) 281. See further the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Amendment Act 87 of 
1992. 
32 See Hofmeyrop cit (n9) 173. 
33 See Hofmeyrop cit (n9) 175. 
outside the Republic and neither the parties nor the cause of action need 
have any connection with the court granting the order'34 
17 
Wallis states that the primary reason for the inclusion of the provisions was 
a considered policy choice by the Legislature 'that it was desirable that creditors 
should be paid and that provisions should be put in place in the legislation that 
would facilitate their ability to secure payment. '35 He argues that the underlying 
motivation for the provisions is a legitimate concern by the State that creditors 
may use the corporate form as a means of avoiding their obligations. In the 
interests of international maritime trade, systems that support and facilitate the 
payment of debts are a desirable State objective. 36 
In a recent Supreme Court of Appeal matter, Wallis, however, does not 
express any of the views above as the purpose behind the legislation. In 
Owners of the MV Silver Star v Hilane Limited [2014] ZASCA 194 (the Hilane 
case), he states that the background to the introduction of the associated ship 
arrest provisions 'was the international trend for ship owners to register all the 
vessels in a particular fleet in separate companies each owning a vessel'. He 
further states that although the Arrest Convention attempted to address this 
issue by providing that an action in rem was not only permissible against the 
concerned ship in relation to which a maritime claim arose, but could also be 
brought in respect of the arrest of another ship owned by the same owner as the 
concerned ship at the time that the maritime claim arose, it was ineffective when 
the vessels were owned by separate one-ship companies. Wallis concludes as 
follows: 
'As the principal author of the Act put it to this court in the Berg,37 in order to 
make liability for a maritime claim or the loss arising from such a claim to fall 
where it belonged by virtue of common ownership of ships or common 
34 See Hofmeyr op cit (n9) 173. 
35 Wallis op cit (n1) 277. 
36 Wallis op cit (n1) 89. 
37 Euromarine International of Mauren v The Ship Berg and Others 1986 (2) SA 700 (A) at 
712A-B. 
control of ship-owning companies, the associated ship provisions were 
devised and incorporated in the Act.'38 
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Despite Wallis's previous criticisms of this as the explanation for the 
purpose of the Act, its inclusion here lends support to the position articulated by 
other authors and provides authority for future judgments. The relevance of this 
enquiry relates inter alia to the analysis of arbitrariness in the context of section 
25(1) of the Constitution, which is dealt with in more detail in the ensuing 
chapters. I now turn to a consideration of how the court will interpret the Act in 
the context of the constitutional challenge. 
IV Interpretation 
(a) General approach to interpretation 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land in South Africa. 39 All legislation, 
including the Act, must be tested and measured against it. The Bill of Rights 
applies to all law and binds the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary.40 
De Ville41 notes that Froneman J, sitting then as a High Court Judge in the 
matter of Matiso and Others v The Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 
and Others, 42 supported the idea that one should adopt the same interpretative 
approach when interpreting the Constitution and statute. Froneman J stated as 
follows: 
'The interpretative notion of ascertaining "the intention of the legislature" 
does not apply in a system of judicial review based on the supremacy of the 
Constitution, for the simple reason that the Constitution is sovereign and not 
the legislature. This means that both the purpose and method of statutory 
interpretation in our law should be different from what it was before the 
commencement of the Constitution on 27 April 1994. The purpose now is to 
test legislation and administrative action against the values and principles 
38 Hilane at para 13. 
39 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC} at 240. 
40 Section 8 of the Constitution. 
41 JR de Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation (2000) (De Ville} 59. 
42 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) at 597. 
imposed by the Constitution. This purpose necessarily has an impact on 
the manner in which both the Constitution itself and a particular piece of 
legislation said to be in conflict with it should be interpreted. The 
interpretation of the Constitution will be directed at ascertaining the 
foundational values inherent to the Constitution, whilst the interpretation of 
the particular legislation will be directed at ascertaining whether that 
legislation is capable of an interpretation which conforms to the fundamental 
values or principles of the Constitution. Constitutional interpretation is thus 
primarily concerned with the recognition and application of constitutional 
values and not with a search for the literal meaning of statutes.'43(Emphasis 
added) 
In the light of the above, I submit that the process of interpreting the 
provisions of the Act should entail a consideration of whether they are capable 
of an interpretation that is in line with the underlying constitutional values and 
principles. 
(b) Interpreting the Bill of Rights 
The Constitution provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, the court 
must interpret the right to property in a manner that promotes the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom. 
Section 39 (2) of the Constitution states that: 
'(2} When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.' 
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The above requirement is not discretionary and must always be taken into 
account by the courts.44 The Constitutional Court has established two 
43 De Ville op cit (n41) 59. 
~1 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaai v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others 2009 (4) SA 222 (CC) at 240. The Court held that 'a court cannot 
enforce a law that is inconsistent with the Constitution'. 
obligations that arise out of section 39{2) in various judgments.45 The first 
obligation is that if a provision is capable of two interpretations and one 
interpretation would render it unconstitutional, the courts should opt for the 
interpretation that would render the provision compatible with the Constitution. 
In the Hyundai case,46 the Court held that: 
'The Constitution requires that judicial officers read legislation, where 
possible, in ways which give effect to its fundamental values. Consistent 
with this, when the constitutionality of legislation is in issue, they are under 
a duty to examine the objects and purport of an Act and to read the 
provisions of the legislation, so far as it is possible, in conformity with the 
Constitution ... judicial officers must prefer interpretations of legislation that 
fall within constitutional bounds over those that do not, provided that such 
interpretation can be reasonably ascribed to the section.' 
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The second obligation is that if a provision is reasonably capable of two 
interpretations, section 39{2) requires the adoption of the interpretation that 
'better' promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. This is a 
requirement even though none of the interpretations results in the provision 
being considered unconstitutional. In Fraser v Absa Bank,47 the Court held that: 
'Section 39(2) requires more from a Court than to avoid an interpretation 
that conflicts with the Bill of Rights. It demands the promotion of the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. These are to be found in the matrix 
and totality of rights and values embodied in the Bill of Rights. It could also 
in appropriate cases be found in the protection of specific rights.' 
In my view, the wording of section 3{7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) is 
clear in its meaning and intent and is thus not open to two interpretations insofar 
as the provisions permit the arrest of a associated ship owned by another 
45 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pfy) Limited and Others: In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pfy) Ltd and Others v 
Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 21 . 
46 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Ply) Limited supra (n45) at paras 22-23. 
47 2007 (3) SA 484 (CC) at para 47. 




In this chapter, I considered the associated ship provisions contained in the Act 
and contextualised section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act. 
explored the purpose of the legislation and highlighted the constitutional 
approach to interpretation of the provision. On the face of it, the provisions 
serve a legitimate governmental purpose.48 By creating not only ownership, but 
also control as the two necessary elements for association, the provisions are 
carefully crafted to overcome strategies that unscrupulous ship~owners might 
use to evade the arrests of associated ships by concealing their ownership or 
control of the ship. However, given the impact on innocent minority 
shareholders, as will be demonstrated in the ensuing chapters, it could be 
argued that the provisions are too intrusive. 
48 In addressing the policy question, Wallis states that it was determination that 'those who 
secure to themselves the benefits of scale and other benefits flowing from the operation of a 
fleet of vessels, should at the same time, by housing each vessel in a discrete company, be 
able to limit the range of assets to which ordinary creditors may have resort in order to secure 
payment of their claims'. He argues that throughout time, legal institutions have, where 
necessary, placed limitations on the ability of shareholders to enjoy separate legal personality 
and through the State helping to ensure that legal debts are paid, it fulfils a legitimate 
government purpose. 
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CHAPTER 3 APPROACH TO ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THE PARTICULAR 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INFRINGE SECTION 25(1) OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
I Aim 
In this chapter, I explore the elements of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
I do so in order to determine what factors courts take into consideration 
when assessing whether there is an infringement of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. The basis for the analysis is the approach used by the 
Constitutional Court in the FNB and Mkontwana decisions. 
II The Property Clause 
The right to property is contained within section 25(1) of the Constitution 
and reads as follows: 
'No one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property' 
The tensions between individual rights and public policy that arise in interpreting 
the property clause in the context of the Bill of Rights are described by Van der 
Walt49 as follows: 
'The meaning of s 25 has to be determined, in each specific case, within an 
interpretative framework that takes due cognisance of the inevitable 
tensions which characterise the operation of the property clause. The 
tension between individual rights and social responsibilities has to be the 
guiding principle in terms of which the section is analysed, interpreted and 
applied in every individual case.' 
The section fulfils two primary functions: it provides that a person's 
property rights may be interfered with in the public interest but regulates the 
parameters for such interference. The interference cannot be arbitrary. In 
order to pass constitutional scrutiny, the statutory interference must meet three 
49 AJ van der Walt 'The Constitutional Property Clause' (1997) at 11. 
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requirements: first, it must be through a law of general application; 5° secondly, it 
must not be arbitrary and, thirdly, the deprivation must be in the public interest. 51 
If it cannot meet these requirements, the provision must be declared 
unconstitutional . 
Ill General Approach to determining whether the Right is Infringed 
De Vos52 outlines the process that must be applied by South African courts in 
assessing whether a fundamental right as set out in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed, in three following stages: the application stage, the limitations stage 
and the remedies stage. In the application phase, the claimant will have to 
demonstrate that they are entitled to the protection provided by the Bill of 
Rights and that the respondent is bound by the duties imposed by the right and 
that the right has been infringed. In the limitations stage, the court will assess 
what the scope of the right is and whether the infringement is justifiable in 
terms of the law. If the deprivation infringes a right protected in the Bill of 
Rights and cannot be justified in terms of section 36, the provision will be 
considered unconstitutional. 53 The remedies stage arises where the court finds 
that the law unjustifiably infringes the fundamental right and in this instance the 
court will need to determine the order that must be made to address the wrong. 
I now turn to deal with the structure of the enquiry as set out in the FNB 
and Mkontwana decisions. Before embarking on the analysis, I briefly set out 
below the key legal issues considered in those cases to provide context for the 
discussions that follow. 
50 This element is dealt with below. 
51 See FNB supra at para 50. Ackermann J states that 'the purpose of s 25 has to be seen 
both as protecting existing private property rights and serving the public interest, mainly in the 
sphere of land reform but not limited there, and also striking a proportionate balance between 
these two functions' . 
52 Pierre de Vos & Warren Freedman South African Constitutional Law in Context (2014) (De 
Vos) 320-321. 
53 FNB supra at para 59. 
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(a) The FNB and Mkontwana cases 
The legal issue in the FNB case concerned the constitutionality of section 114 of 
the Customs and Excise Act54 (the 'Customs and Excise Act'). The 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue had detained vehicles belonging to First 
National Bank ('FNB') for the purpose of obtaining security for a customs-related 
debt owed to it. FNB challenged the constitutionality of the provisions of the 
Customs and Excise Act which allowed the Commissioner to sell the goods 
without a prior judgment or authorisation by the Court (the procedural concern). 
FNB also challenged the Commissioner's right to sell the goods 'even where the 
goods do not belong to the customs debtor but to some third party' (the 
substantive concern). 55 In relation to the substantive concern, the issue before 
the Court was therefore whether it was constitutionally permissible to detain a 
third party's property for another person's debt. 
The legal issue before the Court in the Mkontwana case was whether 
section 118(1) of the Municipal SystemsAct56 infringed section 25(1) of the 
Constitution on the basis that it gave rise to arbitrary deprivation of property. 
The relevant provision in the Municipal Systems Act precluded a registrar of 
deeds from transferring immovable property without a certificate issued by the 
municipality indicating that consumption charges (consumption of water and 
electricity) due two years prior to the date of issue of the certificate had been 
paid. Effectively, this meant that landowners were held responsible for 
payment even in instances where they were not responsible for incurring the 
debt because the land was illegally occupied or occupied by tenants who, 
although contractually responsible for the charges, had failed to pay them. 
(b) Property 
The question that needs to be answered in this context is whether a 
protected property interest is involved. In the FNB case, the Court held 
54 Act 91 of 1964. 
55 FNB supra at para 4. 
56 Act 32 of 2000. 
that it was not necessary to provide an exhaustive list of what constituted 
property for the purpose of section 25(1) of the Constitution. This would be 
determined on the basis of the facts in the relevant case. 
(c) Deprivation 
25 
The second issue to be determined relates to whether there is in fact a 
'deprivation' of property. In the FNB case, Ackerman J held that deprivation did 
not have to mean the taking away of property in its entirety, but that 
'interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property involves 
some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in the 
property concerned'.57 Dispossession is catered for under the expropriation 
provisions in the property clause, section 25(2). 58 
In the Mkontwana case the Court indicated that the question of whether 
there has been a deprivation: 
'depends on the extent of the interference with or limitation of use, 
enjoyment or exploitation [and] at the very least, substantial interference or 
limitation that goes beyond normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment 
found in an open and democratic society would amount to deprivation'.59 
In Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pfy) Ltd and Others, 60 the Court held that deprivation required a 
'substantial interference' for it to be considered unconstitutional in terms of 
section 25(1). It is clear from the above cases that although the underlying 
concept of deprivation as set out in the FNB case is accepted, the courts apply 
a context-specific interpretation to the impugned provision. 
57 FNB supra at para 57. 
58 Mkontwana supra at para 32. 
59 Ibid. 
60 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC) at para 39. 
(d) Law of general application 
The next issue to be determined is whether the relevant Act is a 'law of 
general application'. This refers to valid law that is authorised and 
properly promulgated. The requirement is found within the context of both 
section 25(1) and section 36(1) of the Constitution. 61 Van der Walt 
indicates that in the context of section 25(1) this requires that the law 
authorising the deprivation must be: 
'generally and equally applicable and ensure parity of treatment; non-
arbitrary in the sense that the law is applied according to a discernible 
standard; precise enough so that people can arrange their conduct to meet 
its standards; and accessible in the sense that the law has been publicly 
promulgated and is available to the public at large. '62 
(e) Arbitrariness 
The next issue to consider is whether the deprivation of property in terms 
of the law of general application is arbitrary. In the FNB case, the Court 
held that the deprivation will be considered arbitrary if 'the law of general 
application does not provide sufficient reason for such deprivation and/or 
the deprivation is procedurally unfair'. A useful starting point for this 
enquiry is Ackermann J's view that: 
'Context is critical, both in the sense that the concept 'arbitrary' appears in a 
constitution and in the sense that it must be construed as part of a 
comprehensive and coherent Bill of Rights in a comprehensive and 
coherent constitution. '63 
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61 H Cheadle et al South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 702 indicates that 
the underlying policy of this requirement is that 'it is only a democratically elected legislature that 
has the power to limit rights in order to advance or defend social interests'. 
62 Vander Walt op cit (nS) 232. 
63 FNB supra at para 63. 
(i) What constitutes 'sufficient reason'? 
The Court in the FNB case laid out the steps and requirements for 
establishing a 'sufficient reason' for deprivation as follows: 
(a) ' It is to be determined by evaluating the relationship between means 
employed, namely the deprivation in question and ends sought to be 
achieved, namely the purpose of the law in question. 
(b) A complexity of relationships has to be considered. 
(c) In evaluating the deprivation in question, regard must be had to the 
relationship between the purpose for the deprivation and the person 
whose property is affected. 
(d) In addition, regard must be had to the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property as well as 
the extent of the deprivation in respect of such property. 
(e) Generally speaking, where the property in question is ownership of 
land or a corporeal moveable, a more compelling purpose will have 
to be established in order for the depriving law to constitute sufficient 
reason for the deprivation than in the case when the property is 
something different and the property right is less extensive ... 
(f) Generally speaking, when the deprivation in question embraces all 
incidents of ownership, the purpose for the deprivation will have to be 
more compelling than when the deprivation embraces only some 
incidents of ownership and those incidents apply only partially. 
(g) Depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, the 
nature of the property in question and the extent of its deprivation, 
there may be circumstances when sufficient reason is established by, 
in effect, no more than a mere relationship between means and ends; 
in others this might only be 
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established by proportionality evaluation closer to that required by 
s36( 1) of the Constitution. 
(h) Whether there is sufficient reason to warrant deprivation is a matter 
to be decided on all relevant facts of each particular case, always 
bearing in mind that the enquiry is concerned with 'arbitrary' in 
relation to the deprivation of property under s25.'64 (Emphasis 
added) 
As such, the Court in the FNB case created what Mostert65 terms a 
'flexible' test. He states that: 
'The 'test applied in FNB was all encompassing, resembling the 
proportionality test more closely than the rationality test. But the Court did 
not fix the level of scrutiny for all subsequent cases. In the subsequent 
decision of Mkontwana, the standard of scrutiny differed in respect of the 
non-arbitrariness.'66 
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In the Mkontwana case, Yacoob J stated that the deprivation of property is 
arbitrary within the context of section 25( 1) of the Constitution 'if the law in issue 
either fails to provide 'sufficient reason' for the deprivation or is procedurally 
unfair' .'67 In the process of considering whether a sufficient reason existed, the 
Court indicated that it was necessary to 'evaluate the relationship between the 
purpose of the law and the deprivation effected by that law, the complexity of 
relationships ... including that between the purpose of the provision, on the one 
side, and the owner of the property as well as the property itself on the other. '69 
If no relationship could be established between the purpose of the law, the 
property and its owner, the provision would be considered arbitrary. Mostert 
argues that, according to the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the test in 
64 FNB supra at para 1 00. 
65 Mostert 'The Principles of Properly Law in South Africa 5 ed (2012) 120. 
66 Mostert op cit (n65} 124. 




this case, where deprivations are minimal, a simple identification of the rational 
connection between the means and the ends would suffice. Where the extent of 
the deprivation is greater, however, the Court held that a 'legitimate and 
compelling purpose would be sufficient if it could be shown that it could 
reasonably be expected that the owner bear the risk at stake.'70 
(ii) The purpose of the law 
The emphasis placed by the Court in this enquiry is of some significance to the 
outcome of the analysis. The Court held that although the Customs Act served 
a 'legitimate and important purpose essential for the financial well- being of the 
country and in the interest of all inhabitants', section 114 was far too invasive 
because the means that it used deprived a property owner of its property where 
there existed no element of nexus. 71 
In the Mkontwana case, however, the Court placed emphasis on the 
purpose of the legislation72 by considering the roles of the municipalities in the 
context of a constitutional dispensation. It acknowledged that the purpose of the 
legislation was to place the risk of non-payment of municipal debts on owners 
even in instances where there were illegal land occupiers on their property or 
tenants who occupied the property who had failed to fulfil their contractual 
obligations to effect payment for services, but 'nevertheless held that: 
'The purpose is important, laudable and has the potential to encourage 
regular payments of consumption charges and thereby to contribute to the 
effective discharge by municipalities of their constitutionally mandated 
functions. It also has the potential to encourage owners of the property to 
discharge their civic responsibility by doing what they can to ensure that 
money payable to a government organ for the delivery of service Is 
timeously paid.73 
70 Mostert op cit (n65) 124. 
71 FNB supra at para1 08. 
72 FNB supra at para 38. 
73 Mkontwana supra at para 38. 
The relevance of the Court's difference in approach is dealt with in the 
ensuing chapter. 
(f) The nexus 
In FNB, the Court held that the sanctioning of the deprivation of the 
property occurred in a context where no nexus existed between the 
person and the event giving rise to the customs debt, the property and the 
customs debt. The Court further stated that the person had not placed 
their property within the customs debtor's control to induce the 
Commissioner to act to their detriment. 74 In this element, where one is 
unable to show the relevant nexus, the requirement for a 'sufficient reason ' 
is not fulfiled and therefore deprivation in such circumstances will be 
considered arbitrary. 
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In considering the complexity of the relationships in Mkontwana, the Court 
examined the relationship between the consumption charges and the property. 
Unlike the Court's finding in FNB that there was no connection between the 
property and the customs debt, in the Mkontwana case, the Court found that 
there was a clear relationship between the property and the debt and that the 
property and the consumption charges were 'closely interrelated'.75 The Court 
held that the electricity and water supply to a property were an integral part of 
the property that increased the value of the property. In relation to the 
relationship between the debt and the owner of the property, it held that the 
owner was connected to the property by virtue of the ownership of the property 
which carried associated rights and responsibilities. 
(g) The extent of the deprivation 
In FNB and Mkontwana the Court held that to the extent that there was a 
'minimal deprivation'76 a 'mere rational connection between means and ends 
could be sufficient reason.' However, where the deprivation was greater, 'the 
74 FNB supra at para 108. 
75 Mkontwana supra at para 40. 
76 FNB supra at para 66. 
more compelling the purpose and the closer the relationship between means 
and ends must be'. 77 
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A further point worth noting is that in the Mkontwana case, Yacoob J held 
that the deprivation related to a single incident of ownership, namely the right to 
transfer. The owner could still continue to occupy the property or do anything 
else that ownership allowed and, as such, the deprivation was temporary.78 
77 Mkontwana supra at para 90. 
78 Mkontwana supra at para 45. 
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(h) Differences in the Court's approach 
Van der Walf9 argues that there are two possible ways in which one could 
interpret the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
He indicates that the first approach is to adopt what he refers to as a 'thin' level 
of scrutiny, which is to accept that all the section requires is that there be a 
legitimate government purpose in order to pass the test of whether there is non-
arbitrariness. In this analysis, there would be no need to consider the 
'proportionality between the means and the ends (in other words, the effect of 
the deprivation on the affected owner)'.80 The second way in which one could 
interpret the non-arbitrariness requirement is through a 'thick' substantive 
interpretation.'81 In this analysis, the impact of the deprivation on the affected 
owner needs to be taken into consideration. It is not sufficient that there is a 
legitimate government purpose authorising the deprivation: what is further 
required is that the law permitting the deprivation must achieve a 'proper 
balance between the ends it serves and the means it employs to reach them.'82 
On the basis of this reasoning, even though the deprivation served a legitimate 
governmental objective, where an unduly harsh burden was being placed on the 
affected owner, the deprivation could be found to be arbitrary. 
Van der Walt submits that the Court in the FNB decision clearly adopted a 
'thick substantive interpretation' in its decision.83 He argues persuasively that 
this test is not the same as that applied in Mkontwana, which, he asserts, 
reformulated the test to hold that a 'mere rational connection' suffices where 
there is a minimal deprivation but where there is greater deprivation a more 
compelling rational connection should be established. Secondly, he indicates 
that instead of weighing up the complexity of the relationships as was done in 
79 Van der Walt op cit (n5) 253 
80 Vander Walt op cit (n5) 237. 
81 Van der Walt op cit (n5) 238. 
82 1bid. 
83 He states as follows (at 246): 'In the context of the FNB case, the test set out by the court in 
paragraph 100 was thicker than mere rationality because it was clear that a strong reason for 
the deprivation was required in the circumstances since the affected right was ownership; all the 
incidents of ownership were affected by the deprivation; and there was no nexus or relationship 
between either the affected owner or the affected property and the purpose of the deprivation.' 
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the FNB case, the Court in Mkontwana indicated that 'there would be sufficient 
reason for the deprivation if the government purpose was both legitimate and 
compelling and if it would, in the circumstances, not be unreasonable to expect 
the owner to take the risk of non-payment'.84 The test applied in Mkontwana 
was therefore reduced to two questions: first, whether the reason for the 
deprivation is 'legitimate and compelling'; and, secondly, whether it would be 
unreasonable in the circumstances to 'place the burden where the provision 
does'.85 This, he argues, demonstrates that the Mkontwana test comes closer 
to the thin rationality test. 86 
The significance of the refinement of the approach adopted by the Court 
forms the basis of the underlying arguments for and against the constitutionality 
of the provisions, and accordingly is dealt with further in the ensuing chapters. 
IV Conclusion 
In this chapter, I outlined the process of analysing whether section 25(1) of the 
Constitution has been infringed. I did so by reviewing the difference in approach 
applied by the Court in the FNB and Mkontwana case. I now turn to applying 
the principles articulated in this chapter to the relevant provisions of the Act. 
84 Van der Walt op cit (n5) 250. 
85 1bid. . 
86 Van der Walt op cit (n5) 256. 
CHAPTER 4 DETERMINING WHETHER THE ASSOCIATED SHIP 
PROVISIONS INFRINGE THE PROPERTY CLAUSE 
I Aim 
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In this chapter, by applying the Court's reasoning in the FNB and Mkontwana 
cases, I consider whether through the application of 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 
3(7)(b)(i) of the Act minority shareholders are arbitrarily deprived of their 
property rights in contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The 
structure of the analysis followed is largely as set out in the FNB case. 
II The Analysis 
(a) The meaning of 'property' in Section 25 as applied to the provisions of the 
Act 
It is submitted that the property interest referred to in section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with 
section 3(7)(b)(i) relates to the shareholders' (including the minority 
shareholders') interest in the ship through the ship-owning company.87 South 
African law recognises that shares in a company 'constitute a special category 
of contract-based rights and are generally regarded as constitutional property'.88 
The essence of a share is reflected in Borland's Trustee v Steel Brother & 
Company Ltd:89 
'A share is not a sum of money settled in the way suggested, but is an 
interest measured by a sum of money and made up by various rights 
contained in the contract, including the right to a sum of money of a more or 
less amount.' 
67 Although the primary focus of this dissertation is the impact of the associated ship provisions 
on minority shareholders in a company, in my view the same constitutional concems with regard 
to the arbitrary deprivation of property arise in relation to minority shareholders who hold shares 
in a ship. In terms of section 3(7)(b)(iii) of the Act, a company includes 'any other juristic person 
and any body of persons'. Wallis op cit (n1) 150 states that the associated ship provisions would 
therefore apply to any form of corporate ownership. The property interests of the minorities in 
any ofthose corporate structures also deserve constitutional protection. 
ee Van derWaltop cit (n5} 153. 
69 Borland's Trustee v Steel Brother & Company Ltd [190 1) Chapter 279. 
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 ('Companies Act') defines a share as 
'one of the units into which the proprietary interest in a profit company is 
divided'. 90 In Cooper v Boyes, 91 the Court held that: 
' ... a share represents an interest in a company, which interest consists of a 
complex set of personal rights which may, as a incorporeal movable entity, 
be negotiated or otherwise disposed of. It is certainly not a consumable 
even though a money value can be placed on it'.92 
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On the basis of this, in my view, the constitutional property which minority 
shareholders are deprived of once their vessel is attached is the value of their 
proprietary interests in the ship-owning company. 
(b) The approach to 'deprivation' in the context of section 25 
The next issue to be determined relates to whether it could be argued that there 
is a 'deprivation' of their property rights. The successful application of section 
3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) results in a ship being placed under arrest. 
This Act therefore interferes with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of the 
shareholder's property. To the extent that the parties are able to furnish 
security, the arrest may be short-lived. Where they are not able to do so, the 
Court may at any time while the ship is under arrest order that the ship may be 
sold in accordance with section 9(1) of Act read with Rule 21(4) of the Admiralty 
Proceedings Rules. Although this is a discretionary exercise of power by the 
Court that is unlikely to be applied where the defendant can demonstrate a 
defence to the applicant's claim, the threat of the loss of the ship 'imposes a 
substantial burden on the owner.'93 Whether the arrest is short-lived through the 
90 Section 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
91 1994 (4) SA 521 (C). 
92 Cooperv Boyes supra (n91) at 535. 
93 It is conceded that the courts have demonstrated that they will not easily exercise the power 
to sell the vessel. See Sheriff of Cape Town v MT Argun ("The Argun'J 2001 (3) SA 1230 (SCA), 
where Scott JA states at para 34: 'The relief sought, as I have indicated, was an order for the 
sale of the vessel. Section 9 of the Act affords the Court a wide discretion to order 'at any time' 
that property arrested in terms of the Act be sold. Nonetheless, that discretion will be sparingly 
exercised pendente lite and, where a claim is contested, the Court will be reluctant to order the 
sale of the arrested property if there is a reasonable prospect that the owner will be able to show 
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provision of security or sold, it is clear that once the ship is attached, the 
property right is interfered with. 94 This view is further supported by considering 
the principle applied by O'Regan J in the Mkontwana decision, where she stated 
that: 
'It could be argued that "deprivation" in section 25(1) relates only to the 
complete removal of ownership or other real rights in property and not to 
limitation on real rights. There can be no doubt that some deprivations of 
property rights, although not depriving an owner of the property in its 
entirety, or depriving the holder of that real right, could nevertheless 
constitute a significant impairment in the interest that the owner or real right 
holder has in the property. The value of the properly in material and non-
material terms to the owner may be significantly harmed by a limitation of 
the rights of use or enjoyment of the property. If one of the purposes of 
section 25(1) is to recognise both the material and non-material value of 
property to owners, it would defeat that purpose were "deprivation" to be 
read narrowly.'95 (Emphasis added) 
Lastly, the point is illustrated by Didcott J in Katagum Wholesale 
Commodities Company Limited v The MV Paz,96 although this case related to 
the application of the previous section 5(3): 
'It is a serious business to attach a ship. To stop or delay its departure from 
our ports, to interrupt its voyage for longer than the period it was due to 
that the ground for the arrest is not a good cause of action. Indeed, an order in such 
circumstances has rightly been described as "Draconian". 
94 The effect ofthe ship arrest in accordance with the provisions of Admiralty Rules (the Rules) 
is that the vessel is entrusted to the sheriff, who is entitled to remuneration. The owner of the 
vessel therefore has no right of use over the vessel which in tum means that it is not able to use 
its asset for commercial gain. In terms of section 9(1) of the Act, the ship may be sold. Section 
9(2) of the Act provides that the proceeds of any property sold shall constitute a fund to be held 
in court cir managed in accordance with the rules or any order of the court. See Wallis at 275, 
where he states that where there is delay, cargo owners could also bring claims against the 
owners of the associated ship as carrier of that cargo and, further, if the associated ship is under 
charter, the charterer could also have a claim based on the delay. Only by furnishing security 
can the owner of the vessel circumvent these consequences. However, as Wallis further points 
out, the provisioning of security comes at cost which generally can't be recovered. This issue is 
dealt with further in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
95 Mkontwana supra at para 89. 
96 1964 (3) SA 261 (N) at 263. 
remain, can have and usually has consequences which are commercially 
damaging to its owner or charterer, not to mention those who are relying 
upon its arrival at other ports to load or discharge cargo .... ' 
(c) Considering whether the Act is a 'law of general application' 
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In a recent High Court decision, Credit Europe Bank NV v MV Tari~7 ( ' Tarik 
case'), the court stated that 'the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act is law of 
general application'. 98 Although not part of the ratio decidendi, in my view, this 
observation is supported for the reasons set out below. The Act maintains 
admiralty as a discrete and defined jurisdiction and expands the court's 
jurisdiction over foreigners and foreign causes of action. 99 It singles out a 
particular group of debtors and affords them differential treatment. The 
difference in treatment for admiralty is rational for the reasons given by Hofmeyr, 
where he states that 'the very rationale for a separate admiralty 
jurisdiction is the practical need to accommodate foreign claims against the 
elusive ship' .100 This does not, however, mean that it is not a law of general 
application. Currie 101 states that the requirement for a law of general application 
is not that it needs to apply to everyone. What is required is that it applies 
equally to those who are affected by its application. The Act is precise and 
clear and applies equally to those who are covered by its application and 
clearly sets out their rights and obligations. 
(d) The meaning of arbitrary' in section 25 as applied to the provisions of the 
Act 
Wallis 102simplifies the factors set out by Ackermann in the FNB case in 
determining whether there is a 'sufficient reason' for the deprivation by 
97 Case No A 80/2014 delivered on 5 December 2014. 
98 Tarik supra at para 13. 
99 Hofmeyrop cit (n9) 18. 
100 Hofmeyr op cit (n9) 19. He goes on to say that part of the reasons why it is necessary to 
have a separate jurisdiction for admiralty is that there are 'international business expectations 
and arrangements and practises in place that rely on the fact that jurisdiction will be asserted 
over ships in special ways'. 
101 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 169. 
102 Wallis op cit (n1) 274. 
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suggesting that there are three primary issues that need to be considered in 
order to assess whether the deprivation of property in the context of the 
associated ship provisions is arbitrary. The first is an identification of the 
reasons why the Legislature created the situation where the particular 
deprivation occurs and whether that deprivation properly fits that purpose 
(referred to below as 'the purpose of the law'). The second relates to the extent 
of the deprivation -the greater it is, the more compelling the justification must 
be (referred to below as the 'extent of the deprivation'). The third relates to the 
nexus between the party and the indebtedness (referred to below as 'the 
nexus'). This summary, which encapsulates all the critical elements of the test 
laid out in FNB, provides a framework within which to conduct the analysis in 
relation to the provisions in the Act. I tum now to deal with the relevant factors 
below. 
(i) The purpose of the law 
Wallis indicates that the primary reason for the inclusion of the provisions was a 
considered policy choice by the Legislature 'that it was desirable that creditors 
should be paid and that provisions should be put in place in the legislation that 
would facilitate their ability to secure payment' .103 On the basis of this 
justification for the inclusion of the provisions set out in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation, it is contended that the provisions serve a legitimate governmental 
purpose.104 By creating not only ownership but also control as the two 
necessary elements of association, the provisions are carefully crafted to 
overcome strategies that unscrupulous ship owners might use to evade the 
arrest of associated ships by concealing their ownership or control of the ship. 
103 Wallis op cit (n1) 277. 
104 Wallis op cit (n1) 276. In addressing the policy question states that it was determination that 
'those who secure to themselves the benefits of scale and other benefits flowing from the 
operation of a fleet of vessels, should at the same time, by housing each vessel in a discrete 
company, be able to limit the range of assets to which ordinary creditors may have resort in order 
to secure payment of their claims. He argues that, throughout time, legal institutions have, where 
necessary, placed limitations on the ability of shareholders to enjoy separate legal personality 
and through the State helping to ensure that legal debts are paid, it fulfils a legitimate 
government purpose. 
39 
(ii) The extent of the deprivation 
Wallis argues that the extent of the deprivation pursuant to an associated ship 
arrest depends on the response to the arrest.105 In his view, where security is 
furnished, the impact may not be excessive because the vessel might be 
temporarily delayed and any event would in all likelihood be discharging or 
loading cargo or engaged in similar activities in the scope of its operations. 
However, where there are delays borne by the vessel, cargo-owners may bring 
claims based on the delay and penalties relating to port usage and demurrage 
that may be incurred. Where disputes are raised regarding the security, the 
owners stand to suffer commercial harm. Where security is not furnished at all 
or not furnished timeously, the owner stands to lose the vessel. The loss of the 
vessel means that the likelihood of the owner recovering anything from the 
proceeds of the sale will be remote. According to Wallis, questions pertaining to 
the constitutionality of legislation cannot be determined on the most extreme or 
unusual of implications but rather on the 'ordinary range of potential 
consequences of the provisions' .106 
If one is to apply this test and consider 'the ordinary range of potential 
consequences' for the minority shareholder, it is clear from the consequences of 
the arrest of an associated ship that the impact of the deprivation on minority 
shareholders cannot be categorised as trivial. 
An alternative argument to counter this position could be presented as 
follows. In the context of section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act 
deprivation in the context of a ship arrest affects the right to use the ship only, 
but that does not constitute a deprivation of the shares within the company 
because those shares are still retained even though their value is diminished in 
the instance \rVhere the ship constitutes the only asset of the company. On this 
basis, the minority shareholder can continue to retain the shares because the 
subject-matter of the sale is not the shares in the company. It is submitted that 
this position is incorrect because the value of the minority shareholder's property 
105 1bid. 
106 1bid. 
interest is materially negatively affected by the arrest of the ship.107 This 
argument is dealt with in further detail in the ensuing chapter. 
(e) The nexus 
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The issue of whether there is sufficient nexus differs depending on whether one 
adopts the reasoning in the FNB or the Mkontwana case. Similar to the Court's 
finding in the FNB case, in the context of section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 
3(7)(b)(i), it can be argued that the nexus between the minority shareholder and 
the wrongful conduct giving rise to the debt is remote for the following reasons. 
The minority shareholder has no connection with the transaction giving rise to 
the liability of the concerned ship. The associated ship is a separate legal entity 
and the minority shareholder (in the absence of the procedure in the Act) owes 
no liability to the claimant. On the basis of common majority ownership and 
control of the concerned and associated ship, the legislation imposes extends 
its reach to the minority shareholder's property through no fault or wrongdoing 
on their part. 
However, based on the reasoning set out in Mkontwana, one could argue 
that there is a nexus between the debt of the concerned ship and the associated 
ship through the common majority and controlling shareholder. Similar to the 
Court's findings in Mkontwana that the owner could be held liable for the 
consumption charges incurred even though there were illegal occupiers on the 
land or where there were tenants that were contractually liable to pay for the 
charges but failed to do so, it could be argued that the nexus is established 
through the common majority shareholder in both entities. This could arguably 
suffice to create a 'mere rational connection' in instances where the deprivation 
of property is minimal. 
(f) Is there a 'sufficient reason' for the deprivation of the property? 
On the basis of the Court's reasoning in FNB, it does not suffice that there 
is a legitimate government purpose authorising the deprivation, because 
the Act does not achieve a proper balance between the ends it serves 
and the means it employs to reach them. The proposition would 
therefore be that even though the deprivation serves a legitimate 
governmental objective, an unduly harsh burden is being placed on the 
affected owner and for this reason the deprivation of property must be 
found to be arbitrary. 
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On the basis of the Court's reasoning in Mkontwana one could argue that, 
given that the government's purpose is both legitimate and compelling, in the 
circumstances it is not unreasonable to allocate the risk of the loss in property to 
the minority shareholder because, in effect, the extent of the deprivation of 
property is not that substantial as the minority shareholder still retains the 
shares in the company. Considering the nexus between the owner and the 
property and the owner and the debt one would look at the relationship between 
the majority shareholder and the minority shareholder which, based on Wallis's 
comments, in the context of shipping law is usually a very close one. Given the 
level of scrutiny applied, all that is required to be established is a mere rational 
connection. The arguments in favour of and against the constitutionality of the 
relevant provisions positions are set out in the next chapter. 
Ill Conclusion 
In this chapter, I applied the factors that the Court laid out in the FNB and 
Mkontwana decisions to conduct an analysis of the constitutionality of section 
3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act. In the analysis I contended that 
there was a protected property interest which minority shareholders were 
deprived of through the application of the provisions contained in the Act. I also 
argued that the Act was a law of general application. Depending on which level 
of scrutiny is applied to the issues of constitutionality, either Mkontwana or FNB, 
the answer to the question posed in the dissertation was more complex when 
considering the issue of nexus because the consequences of the outcome of 
this enquiry yields two different results. In the next chapter I consider 
arguments for and against the constitutionaiity of the provisions. 




In the preceding chapter, I applied the factors that the Court laid out in the FNB 
and Mkontwana decisions to section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the 
Act. In this chapter, I consider the arguments against and in support of the 
constitutionality of the provisions. I do so by applying the level of scrutiny in 
applied in the FNB and the Mkontwana cases. In so doing, I shall consider the 
three key elements to assess whether the deprivation is arbitrary, namely: the 
purpose of the legislation (whether it is legitimate and compelling); the extent of 
the deprivation, and the complexity of relationship or nexus between the 
minority shareholder and the debt and the minority shareholder and the 
property. It is submitted that depending on which level of scrutiny is applied 
one could arrive at different conclusions. 
II Arguments Against Constitutionality 
Wallis argues that the constitutional challenge in relation to minority 
shareholders should fail. He states as follows: 
'As said at the outset of this discussion the position cannot be said to be 
absolutely clear-cut, but it is submitted on balance that such a constitutional 
complaint should fail. There are four reasons for saying this. Firstly, the 
existence or otherwise of minority shareholders does not affect the 
legitimacy of purpose of the arrest and in general the proposition that it is 
an appropriate, effective and proportionate means to adopt to achieve the 
purpose of ensuring that legitimate claims are met. Secondly, there is a 
clear and indisputable nexus between the debt arising in respect of the ship 
concerned and the common majority and controlling shareholder in both 
companies. Thirdly, it is reasonable to anticipate that in almost every 
instance . . . there is a close connection between minority and majority 
shareholders and likelihood that the former may have an interest in the 
operation of the group of ship-owning companies as a whole and in the 
financial health of that group. Lastly, one of the accepted hazards of being 
a minority shareholder in a private company is that the risks attendant upon 
the operation of the company will be created by decisions and actions of 
the majority shareholder.'109 
On the basis of the Court's ruling in FNB, I respectfully disagree with 
Wallis's assessment. The reasons for this are provided below. 
(a) The purpose of the Jaw 
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It is conceded that the provisions serve a legitimate governmental purpose.110 
By creating not only ownership but also control as the two necessary elements 
for association, the provisions are intentionally designed to circumvent 
strategies that ship owners might use to avoid arrests of associated ships by 
concealing their ownership or control of the ships. However, given the impact 
on innocent minority shareholders, in my view the provisions are too invasive 
and the net is cast too wide. Even if one accepts that their inclusion serves 
legitimate government policy objectives, in my view, on the basis of the Court's 
reasoning in the FNB case, this would not be sufficient to warrant the 
infringement of a constitutional right in the manner that section 3(7)(a)(ii) read 
with section 3(7)(b)(i) allows. As Ackermann J states: 
'even fiscal statutory provisions, no matter how indispensable they may be 
for the economic well-being of the country - a legitimate governmental 
objective of undisputed high priority- are not immune to the discipline of 
the Constitution and must conform to its normative standards.' 111 
(Emphasis added.) 
The statutory provisions deprive the minority shareholder of their 
property for some other entity's debt unjustifiably. As Staniland states: 
109 Wallis op cit (n1) 285. 
110 Wallis op cit (n 1) 276. In addressing the policy question states that it was determination that 
'those who secure to themselves the benefits of scale and other benefits flowing from the 
operation of a fleet of vessels, should at the same time, by housing each vessel j,  a discrete 
company, be able to limit the range of assets to which ordinary creditors may have resort in 
order to secure payment of their claims.· He argues that throughout time, legal institutions have, 
where necessary, placed limitations on the ability of shareholders to enjoy separate legal 
personality and through the State helping to e.nsure that legal debts are paid, it fulfils a legitimate 
~overnment purpose 
11 FNB supra at para 31. 
'While it is true that the ships represent elusive targets to plaintiffs, this is 
not per se sufficient reason to disregard the separate legal personality of 
separate companies to lift the corporate veil in the absence of special 
circumstances.'112 
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In light of the above, I submit that the remedy chosen by the legislature to 
give effect to the objective of ensuring that debts are paid is too far-reaching. 
When considering the consequences of the provisions for minority shareholders, 
the means employed simply do not justify the end sought to be achieved. For 
this reason I believe that Wallis's first contention as to why the provision must 
pass constitutional review is incorrect. The existence of the minority 
shareholder does affect the legitimacy of the provisions because the extension 
of the application of the provision to them is unwarranted. 
(b) The extent of the deprivation 
The preceding chapter dealt with the potential consequences of an arrest for a 
minority shareholder. I argued that the deprivation cannot be categorised as 
trivial. As Hofmeyr indicates: 
'The fact that the owner of the associated ship can obtain the immediate 
release of its ship by providing security does not, it is submitted, detract 
from the fact that the initial arrest constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of 
property.'113 
Even where the arrest is avoided, the furnishing of security for the 
concerned ship could place a financial burden on the minority shareholder. 
Where the furnishing of security is delayed, commercial harm is suffered by the 
minority shareholder because the company is not able to utilise the ship for 
commercial gain and may in fact incur penalties for the delay. Where the arrest 
is for the purpose of instituting an action in rem, the owner of the associated 
ship will be liable for any judgment against the ship; where they provide security, 
112 Staniland op cit (n14) 426. 
113 See further Hofmeyr op cit (n9) 144. 
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that will also render the owner liable for the judgment and in the case of a 
security arrest, liable for the judgment or award in relation to which security is 
sought.114 It is clear that any of these consequences has a commercial impact 
which is not only a 'potentially onerous burden' but rather a real burden on a 
minority shareholders' interests and therefore 'cogent and substantial 
justification will be required if the deprivation inherent in the situation is not to be 
condemned as arbitrary.'115 
(c) The nexus 
In the preceding chapter I suggested that on the basis of the Court's reasoning 
in the FNB case, one could argue that the link between the minority shareholder 
and the transaction giving rise to the liability of the concerned ship could be 
remote. Wallis does not point to a nexus between the minority shareholder and 
the concerned ship but merely refers to the nexus between the concerned ship 
and 'the common majority and controlling shareholder.' He suggests that 
because most one ship companies are private companies, there is some 
connection between the shareholders, either through familial connections, 
employee relationships or business associations. 116 Wallis further contends 
that minority shareholders bind themselves to accept the inherent risk of 
actions taken by the majority when they become minority shareholders. 
I submit that even if there may in certain instances be close relationships 
between the majority and minority shareholders, this is not a fact to be assumed 
in all cases and cannot therefore be a justification in the context. This is 
particularly so Where minority shareholders may equally be equity investors 
seeking to gain a return on their investment in a ship-owning company. For this 
reason I respectfully submit that Wallis's reasoning must be rejected. 
I further submit that even if it could be argued that minority shareholders 
generally accept the inherent risk in relation to their participation as a minority 
114 Wallis op cit (n1 ) 276. 
115 1bid. 
116 Wallis op cit (n1) 284. 
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shareholder in an entity, their risk is in relation to their particular company and 
not in relation to other separate juristic personalities. Their decisions are 
therefore based on the financial soundness and a risk assessment in relation to 
their investment. In my view, one could therefore not argue that an arbitrary 
deprivation of a minority shareholder's property is justifiable because they must 
have accepted that they would be bound by the majority's conduct through a 
separate company to which they bore no connection and would, in the absence 
of the procedure in the Act, owe no liability in respect of the claim. 
Ill Arguments In Support of Constitutionality 
(a) The purpose of the law 
In applying the Court's reasoning as set out in the Mkontwana case, a key 
departure point for the enquiry into constitutionality pertains to whether the 
legislation is legitimate and compelling. On the basis of what is set out in the 
Hilane case, it could be argued that the provisions are key and commendable. 
They contribute to ensuring fairness in the commercial context where the very 
nature of the trade makes it difficult to hold debtors to account. As Ploos van 
Amstel J in the Tarik case states with regard to the Act: 
'The provisions in the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act ... are aimed at 
assisting creditors to obtain payment of what is due to them without 
difficulties relating to jurisdiction and security for their claims.'117 
It could be further contended that the provisions are crafted in a manner 
that protects both ship-owners and claimants because the process of 
establishing the association is not a simple and easy one, likely to be abused in 
its application. As Davies 118indicates, if the arrest of an associated ship is 
challenged, the applicant needs to prove the relevant connection between the 
two entities on a balance of probabilities. Access to such information may be 
difficult and discovery in South African law is not permitted as a fishing 
117 Tarik supra at para 22. 






expedition for unspecified documents.119 This means that the applicant will 
have to navigate through the often complex and mysterious company structures 
to establish the details behind ownership and control. This substantive aspect 
places a significant burden on any applicant seeking to arrest an associated 
vessel. 
(i) The nature of the affected property and the extent of the deprivation 
In the preceding chapter, I indicated that the Court in Mkontwana stated that 
where there was a 'minimal deprivation'120 of property, a 'mere rational 
connection between means and ends could be sufficient reason.' However 
where the deprivation was greater, 'the more compelling the purpose and the 
closer the relationship between means and ends must be.'121 In the context of 
arguing in support of the constitutionality of the provisions, I submit that there 
are three potential arguments that could be considered. 
Firstly, it could be argued that the extent of the deprivation is minimal on 
the basis that (a) the property that is being deprived is the ship and not the 
actual property of the minority shareholder, namely the shares in the company 
itself and (b) the impact of the deprivation on the value of the company is 
minimal because the shares are still retained. 
If the court is not persuaded that the deprivation is a severe consequence, 
either on the basis of the argument that the minority shareholder still retains its 
shares or alternatively on the basis of Wallis's contention that one must consider 
only the 'ordinary range of potential consequences' of the provisions, it is 
possible that the court could apply a thin level of scrutiny. In this instance, the 
court would only seek to uncover, in light of the compelling purpose of the 
legislation a 'mere rational connection' between the means and the ends. 
119 Hofmeyr op cit (n9) 235-236 
120 Ibid. 
121 1bid. 
(b) The nexus 
The Court in Mkontwana held that the nexus could be established 
between the property owner and the debt even if there were illegal 
inhabitants on the property consuming the services or where there were 
tenants that were contractually bound to pay for the services but had failed 
to do so. Using the same analogy, one could argue that there is a nexus 
between the minority shareholder and the debt even though the minority 
shareholder had no knowledge of the debt nor was he liable for the debt 
attached to the concerned ship. In relation to the nexus between the 
minority shareholder and the concerned ship, it could be argued that there 
is a clear relationship between the minority shareholder and the majority 
shareholder who controls the company through their joint participation in 
the ship- owning company on the basis of how Wallis indicates that these 
relationships are generally structured in the industry. This is considered 
further below. 
(i) Minority shareholder responsibilities 
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Wallis argues that minority shareholders take on an inherent risk when they 
agree to take up a minority shareholding in an entity. He contends that it is the 
minority shareholder's responsibility to ensure that they are familiar with the 
provisions of the legislation in relation to South Africa if it is likely that the 
business that they have invested in may be affected by South African 
legislation. They would therefore be forewarned about the unique position of 
associated ships and should therefore act prudently in ensuring that the 
controlling shareholder in no way acts to the potential detriment of the minority 
shareholder. I submit that they could do this by ensuring that they conduct a 
proper due diligence on the entities with which they will be contracting to 
ensure that such entities are reputable and able to meet their financial 
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obligations. Secondly, they could provide in their respective shareholders' 
agreements that there will be relevant consequences for the parties in the event 
of their company assets being negatively impacted as a result of the 
enforcement of the associated ship provisions. This may include that there is an 
option that would immediately allow the minority shareholder to sell its interest in 
the company at an appropriate value or to claim damages for breach of contract. 
IV The More Persuasive Argument 
In my view, FNB provides a better exposition for the issue of constitutionality. 
The argument based on the Mkontwana case presents various concerns. 
These are dealt with in turn below. 
While the purpose of the law is compelling and legitimate, given the 
potential extent of the deprivation and the impact of the impairment on the 
minority shareholder's property rights, it is not sufficient to apply the thin test 
adopted in the Mkontwana case but rather the thick test espoused in the FNB 
case. As indicated in the FNB case, no matter how compelling the justification 
for the legislation might be, it must still be subjected to constitutional scrutiny. 
The proposition that the shares are still retained by the minority 
shareholder and the extent of the deprivation is minimal is not persuasive 
because the arrest of the ship 'constitutes a significant impairment in the 
interest' that the minority shareholder holds in the company. While in certain 
instances it could be considered that the deprivation is temporary, I submit that 
the court will need to consider the full series of possibilities in relation to the 
arrest of the ship. As indicated above, even where the arrest is avoided, the 
furnishing of security for the concerned ship could place a financial burden on 
the minority shareholder. This factor should discount the triviality of the 
deprivation. 
The primary concern however relates to the issue of nexus between the 
minority shareholder and the debt and the minority shareholder and the majority 
shareholder. As indicated above, in relation to the latter, the nexus is 
established by their joint shareholding, however in relation to the former, it is 
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conceivable that the minority shareholder may have no knowledge of the claim 
against the concerned ship or bear no responsibility or liability for the debt. Yet, 
through its shareholding in a separate juristic entity, it is deprived of its property. 
The difference between the Mkontwana facts and the application of the 
associated ship provisions is that while the property continues at all times to 
belong to the property owner in the instance of the facts presented in 
Mkontwana, in the case of the associated ship provisions, the minority 
shareholder's property is of an entity that has a different juristic personality. 
This therefore means that in Mkontwana the charges are consumed in relation 
to the owner's own property but in the case of the associated ship arrest, the 
liability is incurred in relation to a completely different corporate juristic entity. 
IV Conclusion 
In this chapter I have aimed to present arguments both in support of and 
against constitutionality. I have demonstrated that while the objectives of the Act 
are legitimate objectives, given their impact on minority shareholders, the 
relevant provisions of the Act undermine the 'perfectly legitimate use of the 
corporate form to limit risk in commercial undertakings generally and in shipping 
particularly.'122 The effect of the deprivation of the property rights of minority 
shareholders is disproportionate to the good achieved by the legislated 
infringement of such rights. 
122 Bradfield op cit (n21) 240. 
CHAPTER 6 THE LIMITATIONS CLAUSE 
I Aim 
Having considered that the application of the Court's reasoning in the FNB 
case could result in a successful challenge against the constitutionality of 
section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act, in this chapter I will 
assess whether it could be argued that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society, based on section 36(1) of 
the Constitution. 
II General Approach to Section 36(1) of the Constitution 
Section 36(1) of the Constitution provides that rights set out in the .Bill of 
Rights can be limited in terms of a law of general application only to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The 
court conducts a two-stage analysis.123 In the first stage, the minority 
shareholder would have to convince the court that there was a property 
right protected by the Constitution, 124 and that, through a law of general 
application, such property right has been infringed.125 In stage two of the 
analysis, the party relying on the validity of the provision in the Act would 
have to persuade the court that the infringement can be justified in terms 
of section 36 of the Constitution.126 
In assessing whether the limitation meets the relevant threshold, 
the factors that the court takes into account include the following: the 
nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the 
nature and extent of the limitation; the relationship between the iimitation 
and its purpose, and whether there are the less restrictive means to 
123 De Vos op cit (n52} 354. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid. 
126 FNB supra (n3) para 100. 
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achieve the objectives of the legislation. 127 in the context of the right to 
property, the process is somewhat complex because, as Van der Walt 
cautions, section 25(1) contains 'a special category of a limitation of 
property, namely, deprivation'.128 This internal limitation (otherwise 
referred to as an 'internal modifier') therefore already limits the scope and 
content of the right.129 
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Van der Walt argues that it is highly unlikely (except in the most limited of 
circumstances) that deprivation found to be arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution will be found to be reasonable in terms of section 36(1).130 In 
the FNB case, while noting that once the deprivation is considered to be 
arbitrary, there may be no further need for an analysis in terms of section 36, 
Ackerman J concluded that the infringement of section 25(1) is still subject to 
the limitations clause.131 I will therefore briefly examine whether the infringement 
of the minority shareholder's property rights in terms of section 3(7)(a)(ii) read 
with section 3(7)(b)(i) constitutes a reasonable and justifiable limitation on the 
right to property in section 25(1 ). I will not deal at length here with the elements 
of section 36 that overlap with the limitations analysis conducted in relation to 
section 25(1), as that has already been dealt with in detail in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
In the FNB case, Ackerman J held that it was unnecessary to consider in 
detail the justification analysis incorporating the test of proportionality applied to 
the balancing of different interests, because FNB's ownership of the vehicles 
was in the end completely destroyed by the operation of the provisions of the 
Customs Act. Based on the Court's finding that there was no connection 
127 Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
1~ Vander Walt op cit (n5) 121 . 
129 De Vos op cit (n52) 358. 
130 Van der Walt op cit (n5) 78. 
131 FNB supra (n3) para 1 00. Ackerman J states that 'By its terms, s 36 of the Constitution draws 
no distinction between any rights in the Bill of Rights when it provides that "[t]he rights in the Bill 
of Rights may be limited". Neither the text nor the purpose of s 36 suggests that any right in the 
Bill of Rights is excluded from limitation under its provisions. In view of the conclusion ultimately 
reached on this part of the case, it is not neeessary to decide this question finally here. It will be 
assumed, without deciding that an infringement of s 25(1) of the Constitution is subject to the 
provisions of s 36.' 
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between FNB or its vehicles and the customs debt, the Court found that the 
means adopted to pursue the objectives of the Act were 'grossly disproportional' 
to the infringement of FNB's property rights.132 In my view, the same conclusion 
is applicable in relation to a minority shareholder's property rights because, as 
stated above, there is no connection between the minority shareholder and the 
liability of the concerned ship. The means adopted to achieve the objectives of 
the Act are therefore grossly disproportional to the infringement of the minority 
shareholder's property rights and accordingly unreasonable and unjustifiable. 
The reason for this conclusion is set out below. 
(a) The application of the Section 36(1) 
The approach to be adopted in applying the proportionality test is set out 
inS v Makwanyane and Another,133 and was modified for the 1996 
Constitution in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and 
Another v Minister of Justice and Others.134 For the purposes of 
conducting the analysis, I shall use the steps set out by De Vos 135 (which 
clarify the approach adopted by the Constitutional Court). 
{i) The Legitimate Purpose 
The first question that needs to be answered in the limitations analysis is 
whether the limiting measure serves a legitimate purpose. In chapter 2, I 
dealt extensively with the various views on the underlying purpose of the 
Act I will not repeat all those arguments here. The brief answer to the 
question for the purposes of this analysis is that the limiting measures do 
serve a legitimate purpose. 
(ii) The Rational Connection 
The second question that needs to be considered is whether there is a 
rational connection between the limiting measure and its stated purpose. 
In my view, it could be argued that there is a rational connection between the 
objectives of the Act and the deprivation of the majority shareholder's 
132 FNB supra (n3) para 111. 
1331995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
134 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
135 De Vos op cit (n52) 372. 
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property, but there is no rational connection between the stated objectives of the 
Act and the deprivation of the minority shareholder's property because, through 
the application of the relevant provisions of the Act, the minority shareholder is 
deprived of their property interests in instances where the they have no 
connection with the claimant or the maritime debt of the concerned ship. 
(a) Less Restrictive Means 
In conducting this analysis, one is required to consider whether there are 
alternative measures that are less restrictive of the right to property and, 
secondly, whether the measure chosen by the Legislature is appropriate 
('well-tailored ') in the light of all the circumstances.136 
In my view, there are at least two alternative measures that could be 
considered that would be less restrictive of the right to property, taking into 
consideration the objectives of the Act. The first would be to revert to the 
position prior to the 1992 amendment, which was that ownership would be 
deemed only where all the shares in the company are owned by the same 
person. This would effectively amount to resorting to the 'sister-ship' provisions 
contained in the Arrest Convention. Although these provisions might not 
attract constitutional scrutiny, it is submitted that these provisions would be 
rendered ineffective. The second alternative option could be to provide for the 
application of the provision in certain limited circumstances. This suggestion is 
set against the background of the current discussions within the Comite 
Maritime International {'CMI') 137 regarding the adoption of provisions similar to 
theassociated ship provisions. Recommendations proposed by various 
countries for the adoption of such provisions have been rejected by the majority 
of countries primarily on the basis that they create a special basis for 'piercing 
the corporate veil' in the maritime context. 
In the following chapter, I seek to examine more closely the concerns 
expressed by other international systems. This review is conducted to consider 
136 Ibid. 
137 The Comite Maritime lntemational is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation, comprising 
individuals and National Associations of Maritime Law whose primary objective is to further the 
unification of maritime law. See www.comitemaritime.org. 
two critical issues: (a) to examine whether there is support for the contention 
that the associated ship provisions in the Act are too expansive by considering 
on what basis they have not been adopted by other leading maritime nations; 
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(b) to examine whether or not there is an alternative option that could be crafted 
to address the constitutional concerns regarding the associated ship provisions. 
If the latter is possible, it is submitted that an argument could be made that there 
are less restrictive means that could be adopted to achieve the objectives of the 
Act and that fall within the constitutional parameters. 
Ill Conclusion 
In this chapter, I considered whether, if found to infringe section 25(1) of the 
Constitution, the relevant provisions of the Act could nevertheless be saved by 
the limitations clause as set out in the Constitution. In subjecting the provisions 
of the Act to the section 36(1) analysis, I suggested that there were less 
restrictive means that could be applied to achieve the objectives of the Act. In 
this regard, I proposed that a review of some comparative international 
jurisdictions could be conducted with the aim of obtaining a view on how they 
view the associated ship provisions. I now turn to conduct the review and 
examine whether there are 'less restrictive means' to achieve the objectives of 
the Act. 




In the preceding chapter, I considered inter alia whether there were less 
restrictive means that could be used to meet the objectives of the Act. In this 
chapter, I conduct the review by considering the current debates in comparative 
international jurisdictions 138 regarding provisions similar to the associated ship 
provisions contained in the Act. The aim of this analysis is to achieve two 
objectives. The first is to see whether there is support for the contention that the 
provisions are too expansive as contended in this dissertation (and the possible 
basis for this view) by reviewing the position in other comparative maritime 
jurisdictions. The second objective is to assess whether an alternative option 
that constitutes 'less restrictive means 'could be developed. 
Rather than consider the country-specific associated ship arrest 
provisions,139 I will examine the key arguments raised in relation to the proposed 
amendments in the Comite Maritime International (CMI) Position Paper, which 
developed as a result of the various proposed legislative changes relating to the 
'sister ship' provisions. In order to contextualise the primary concerns with the 
associated ship provisions expressed by parties in international jurisdictions, 
nameiy that they amount to 'piercing the corporate veil' ,140 a brief synopsis of 
the company law principles relating to the concept in the context of South 
African law will be provided. 
138 As the Arrest Convention has been adopted in the national legislation of a number of 
countries, I consider the Lisbon Convention as representative of national laws. 
139 See Berlingieri Arrest of Ships: A Commentary on the 1952 and 1999 Arrest Conventions 5 
ed (2011) 265-282 for a review of the national laws and jurisprudence on the position of 
eiercing the corporate veil' in the context of associated ships (Berlingieri). 
40 See F arouk Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (20 12) ( Cassim et al) at 41. The 
process effectively allows the court to disregard the separate legal personality of the company 
and to shift its focus to the natural persons behind the company, or in control of its activities 'as 
if there were no dichotomy between such person and the company' 
II Piercing the Corporate Veil 
In Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim, 141 the Court held that: 'one of 
the most fundamental consequences of incorporation is that ... a company 
is a juristic entity separate from its members.' 
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The incorporation of a company142 results in limited liability for the 
shareholders of the company. In general, shareholders are not liable for the 
debts of the company. Limited liability, however, cannot be abused143 and it is 
clear that South African courts will look at substance rather than just legal form 
and hold directors or shareholders personally liable in appropriate 
circumstances. When the court elects to do so, this is referred to as 'piercing 
the corporate veil'. The ability to pierce the corporate veil is an exceptional 
remedy to be used only in instances where it is established that there is fraud, 
dishonesty or improper conduct in 'the use of the corporate form' or that the 
corporation is the 'instrument' or 'alter ego' or 'puppet' of its shareholders. '144 
In an Appellate Division decision, Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling 
Investments (Ply) Ltd, 145 the Court held that: 
'It is undoubtedly a salutary principle that our courts should not lightly 
disregard a company's separate personality, but should strive to give effect 
to and uphold it. To do otherwise would negate or undermine the policy and 
principles that underpin the concept of separate corporate personality and 
the legal consequences that attach to it. But where fraud, dishonesty and 
other improper conduct . . . are found to be present, other considerations 
141 2008 (2) SA 303 (C) at 306. 
142 Section 19(1 )(b) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 entrenches the separate legal personality 
of a company. It provides that from the date and time that the company is incorporated, it has all 
the legal powers and capacity of an individual , except to the extent that a juristic person is 
incapable of exercising any such power or having any such capacity except to the extent that 
the Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise. 
143 Dennis Davis et al Companies and Other Business structures in South Africa 3 ed (2013) at 
24. 
144 Bradfield op cit (n21) 240. Note that there are, however, other instances in which the court will 
look beyond the separate legal personality. This may arise in the context of quasi-
partnerships; where it is clear that the intention of parties was to form a partnership; where the 
agency principle is used in relation to imposing liability on a shareholder or director, and where a 
subsidiary company is considered to be the agent of a holding company. 
145 1995 (4} SA 790 (A}. 
come into play. The need to preserve the separate corporate identity would 
in such circumstances have to be balanced against policy considerations 
which arise in favour of piercing the corporate vei1'146 
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Under South African common Jaw, courts can ignore the veil of the 
corporation only where fraudulent use and abuse is made of the fiction of legal 
personality. The ability to pierce the corporate veil was recently legislated in the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (The Companies Act'). It provides in section 20(9) 
that an application can be brought by any interested person or a court in any 
proceedings can determine whether the incorporation, use of a company or any 
act by or on behalf of a company constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the 
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity. The court may declare 
that the company is deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of any right, 
obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company, and 
make any order it considers fit to give effect to such declaration. 
(a) 'Piercing the corporate veil' through the associated ship provisions 
The ability to arrest any of the ships within a fleet is in effect a statutory piercing 
of the corporate veil of the ship-owning companies.147 This is so because what it 
entitles the court to do is to ignore the separate corporate identities of the 
companies in relation to its fleet of vessels by allowing any creditor of any entity 
within the group of companies to arrest the ship. The extent of the deprivation in 
an associated ship arrest is described by Staniland as follows: 
'the associated ship provisions are not content to lift the veil and let it fall in 
special circumstances; instead they shred .it in all cases. And, the shredding 
is done with vengeance, for once the association is established in respect of 
146 Ibid at 803. 
147 Bradfield op cit (n21) states as follows (at 236): 'The provisions "may be described as a 
statutory mode of piercing the corporate veil". Ship-owning companies are treated, as a matter 
of course, as mere facades concealing the identity of the "true" debtor. Once the identity of the 
"true" debtor is established, any ship other than the guilty ship owned or controlled by the true 
debtor may be arrested as an associated ship to enforce the maritime claim in question.' 
one claim all the ships of the associated company may stand exposed to 
arrests for other claims.'148 
The wide-reaching impact of the associated ship provisions in the Act is 
described by Wallis as follows: 
'Where the Act permits the arrest of a true associated ship . . . the maritime 
creditor is thereby enabled to go behind the corporate structure to identify 
the person or persons who control or own the corporate entity and then to 
pursue its claim either against a vessel owned by that person or persons or 
more frequently, a vessel owned by another company altogether . . . the 
disregard of corporate personality can occur in both directions- upwards to 
the controlling interests of the corporate entity controlling the ship or 
downwards from those controlling interests to a ship owned by another 
corporate entity controlled by the same interests. '149 
Ill Comparative Review 
(a) Background 
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In 1999 a new Convention on the Arrest of Ships, referred to as the Lisbon Draft 
Arrest Convention ('Lisbon Convention'), was adopted. The Convention will 
come into force once it has been ratified by ten states. Through the CMI, there 
are ongoing discussions regarding the Convention. In order to address the 
concerns regarding the 'sister ship provision' contained in Article 3 of the 1999 
Convention, the International Sub-Committee sought to draft a rule providing for 
the lifting of the corporate veil between several companies owning ships where 
those companies are controlled and owned by the same person. The Lisbon 
Convention did not cover instances where ship-owners operated one-ship 
companies. Concerns were raised that, in practice, some ship-owning 
companies had used single-ship companies to avoid liability. This concern was 
particularly expressed by the United Kingdom government in relation to 
environmental claims. In order to deal with the concern, the CMI proposed that 
148 Staniland op cit (n14} 423. 
1
"
9 Wallis op cit (n1 ) 89. 
60 
the question of 'piercing the corporate veil' to deal with the issue of ownership 
could be left to national law. The United Kingdom proposed a more extensive 
provision suggesting that arrest be permissible in instances where the ships 
were under common control and suggested that article 3(2) ought to provide 
explicitly for the arrest of associated ships. Their proposal read as follows: 
'(2) Arrest is also permissible of any ship or ships controlled by the person 
who is allegedly liable for the maritime claim; or controls the company that 
is allegedly liable for the maritime claim, and who was, when the claim 
arose: 
(i) the person who controlled the ship in respect of which the maritime claim 
arose; or 
(ii) the demise charterer, time charterer or voyage charterer of that ship [or 
any part of it] 
(3) For the purposes of this article, a person controls a ship if that person 
owns the ship or controls the company that owns it. The national law of the 
State in which the arrest is applied for shall determine whether, for these 
purposes, a person owns a ship or controls a company that owns a ship. 
( 4) Paragraph (2) shall not apply to claims in respect of ownership or 
possession of a ship.' 
It is clear that the above text is similar in some respects to the current provisions 
in the Act relating to associated ships. The United Kingdom further provided a 
list of factors that could demonstrate control, which included the following: 
common or similar names, common shareholding of the companies owning the 
ships, common management or financing arrangements and insurance on a 
fleet basis. The purpose of this was to provide guidance on how national laws 
could define the scope of control, which would assist in creating consistency 
and uniformity in international maritime law. In their explanatory note on the 
motivation for the provision, the United Kingdom delegation specifically states 
'we do not intend to catch banks or other investors with minority share 
ownership but no element of effective control' through the provisions. The 
proposal was supported by some countries, namely, Canada, Japan, Australia 
and the Netherlands, but was rejected by most other countries. 
(b) Views on the United Kingdom proposal 
Greece, a major maritime nation, rejected the proposal on the basis that they 
believed that it supported United Kingdom interests, banking institution interests 
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and shipping management interests. 
Norway supported Greece in rejecting the proposal. They argued that they 
had recently completed a review of their company law legislation and had 
decided against incorporating provisions that would Permit piercing the 
corporate veil. The International Chamber of Shipping also rejected the 
proposal. They argued that the growth in single ship-owning companies was an 
economic consideration, essentially to reduce ship-owners' operating costs. 
They cited as an example that, when trading with countries where insurance 
cover was not available, ship-owners wanted to limit their potential loss, hence 
the creation of single-ship companies. For the purposes of financing their 
operations, ship-owners wanted to attract equity capital. In other instances, it 
was to maximise tax incentives.150 They criticised the guidelines on the basis 
that they created uncertainty and, furthermore, that some of the criteria 
proposed did not necessarily indicate common control - for example, it was not 
an uncommon practice for ship managers to arrange insurance for a fleet of 
vessels with wholly unrelated ship-owners. Finland further argued that the 
principle of 'piercing the corporate veil' was not a specific maritime problem but 
150 See Wallis op cit (n1) 277. He supports the view that there is a justification for single-ship 
companies. He states: There are far too many legitimate business reasons for using this 
corporate form and this general structure for the purpose of engaging in commercial shipping 
operations ... The reality is that ship-owners worldwide have increasingly found it convenient 
from a business perspective, with few commercial disadvantages, to operate fleets of ships on 
the basis that the ownership of the vessels will vest in one ship companies. In doing so it seems 
likely that they have been supported by the financial institutions that provide finance to acquire 
and operate vessels and which secure their own position by way of mortgages. By insisting that 
each vessel in respect of which they provide finance be owned and operated by a one-ship 
company these institutions effectively limit the range of creditors that may pursue claims against 
the vessels, especially those that may enjoy a ranking higher than a mortgage.' 
rather a more general problem of corporate law and China reiterated the point 
by stating as follows: 
'The UK proposals are not in line with internationally generally accepted 
legal persons system or the limited liability corporate system . . . the 
corporate system is an important system prevailing in the modem market 
economy . . . piercing the corporate veil is a problem of general nature and 
therefore should be handled, settled and treated as a specifiC issue of 
general nature. So it is neither proper nor suitable to embody it in a purely 
and simply international shipping convention dealing only with arrests of 
ships. 151' 
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The Confederation internationals des syndicats libres ('CISL') supported 
the United Kingdom position. They raised the concern that the position of 
international seafarers was particularly weak in relation to employers. Their 
argument was that often when lives are lost at sea, the dependants suffer the 
consequences as a result of the loss of a source of income. These dependants 
are often located in different jurisdictions from the persons who own or control 
the vessel. he culprits tend to be entities that own one-ship companies, which 
makes it extremely difficult for the dependant families to enforce any claims. 
They therefore argued that the associated vessel was the only asset against 
which such families could secure, at a minimum, security for their claims. 
The United Kingdom was given an opportunity to amend their initial 
proposal to address some of the concerns raised by other country delegates. 
However, the amendments proposed were ultimately rejected on the grounds 
that they amounted to: 
'a fundamental change in the legal approach that would be adopted 
towards the concept of corporate ownership in many jurisdictions. . . . that 
would have implications perhaps profound for other areas of law including 
and not limited to commercial and corporate law' .152 
151 Berlingieriop cit (n139) 690. 
152 Berlingieri op cit (n139) 688. 
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The objectors raised a further concern that the element of 'control' as 
proposed by the UK constituency was unclear and its application would give an 
unacceptable discretion to the courts. The Heavy Metal case is a clear example 
of the complexity of dealing with the concept of 'control', 153 but the judicial 
development of the concept is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice it to 
say that it is likely that this issue will be revisited in later decisions. 154 In the 
absence of agreement at an international level, the issue of whether the 
corporate veil should be pierced or not will be determined by the lex fori. 
(c) Australia 
Bradfield155 comments that although Australia and South Africa share a 
close history of admiralty jurisdiction, when Australia reviewed its admiralty 
legislation shortly after South Africa had done so, the Australian Law 
Reform Commission ('The Law Commission) opted not to follow the South 
African 'associated ship' provisions but rather adopted what it termed 
'surrogate ship'156 arrests. The difference between this and the 'sister-ship' 
provisions related to ownership at the time that the claim arose and at the 
time of enforcement. The reasons cited for this were that the Law 
Commission: 
153 The issue of what constitutes 'power directly or indirectly' to control a company was dealt with 
in the Heavy Metal case. Although the decision reached by the Supreme Court of Appeal is 
subject to criticism by various South African writers such as Hare and Wallis, it articulates the 
current position in South African law on what is meant by control. The court found that the 
nominee was the registered owner of the majority of the shares in both ships and had the power 
directly to control both companies. See Hare at 110, where he states: 'the court regarded "direct 
power" to be equivalent to de jure power- meaning that the majority shareholder, as registered 
in the share register, controls the shares of the company and therefore determines the fate of 
the company . ... (notwithstanding that he held the shares as a nominee for the beneficial 
owners).' 
154 The Maritime Law Association of South Africa, a body comprising maritime lawyers, has 
proposed amendments to section 3(7){b)(ii) to counter the effect of the decision In the Heavy 
Meta/case. · 
155 Bradfield op cit (n21) 239. 
156 The surrogate ship arrest is essentially based on the sister ship arrest as set out in the Arrest 
Convention. Section 19 of the Admiralty Act 1988(Cth) provides that: 'A proceeding on a general 
maritime claim concerning a ship may be commenced as an action in rem against some other 
ship if: (a) a relevant person in relation to the claim was, when the cause of action arose, the 
owner or charterer of, or in possession or control of, the first mentioned ship; and (b) that person 
is, when the proceeding commenced, the owner of the second-mentioned ship.' 
'preferred in the interests of consistency, to leave the issue of whether the 
corporate veil of the ship-owning company should be disregarded to be 
dealt with as an exceptional remedy granted according to the principles 
applicable in its local corporation and insolvency law'.157 
Secondly, they argued that lifting the corporate veil would lead to 
complications in the context of insolvency, for example where the arrested 
assets were also assets in a corporate insolvency under general 
Australian law. 158 They also expressed concern that, other than South 
Africa, no other jurisdiction permitted piercing of the corporate veil in these 
circumstances but conceded that the emphasis placed on this concern 
should be limited because if the law were to change, there would have to 
be a first (or second). 
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The Law Commission considered that the provision would assist both 
Australian shippers and ship suppliers to recover monies owed by foreign ship-
owners but the concept of establishing formal ownership and control would be 
challenging and time consuming. The onus would be placed on the plaintiff to 
show the relevant nexus and to discharge the burden of proof should the 
owners challenge the application. Given the difficulty in accessing the relevant 
information, there would be practical problems related to the application of the 
provision and they expressed concern that the provision 'had the potential to 
discriminate in its effect against ship owners based in countries where 
information about shareholdings and corporate structures are public'.159 
Although it is clear that at the time of the Law Commission report, Australia 
showed no willingness to adopt the associated provisions contained in the 
157 See further ALCR, where it is stated that 'the fundamental consideration, in the 
Commission's vie"·'· is the undesirability of making special provision with respect to the 
corporate veil in legislation dealing with admiralty jurisdiction. If questions of the liability or 
indebtedness of corporate groups ate to be addressed this is properly done through company or 
insolvency law rather than in a specific legislative context such as admiralty jurisdiction at para 
141.' 
158 The Australian Law Reform Commission Report 33 'Civil Admiralty Jurisdiction' para 139. 
159 Ibid para 140. 
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Act, 160 Glover161 comments that 'this position has been to the disadvantage of 
claimants when looking at the position in comparative jurisdictions, including 
South Africa'. Glover therefore argues that 'consideration should be given to the 
need to strike a new balance which will provide suitable local remedies to 
potential plaintiffs frustrated by the judicial and legislative development of the 
1952 Arrest Convention, but at the same time do not unduly make Australia an 
unattractive destination for foreign shipping'.162 This view is echoed by 
Davis 163, who states that: 
'Although the Commission nad some narsh words for the 1952 Arrest 
Convention, its view of what was internationally acceptable seems to have 
been shaped in large part by the positions taken in that Convention. In 
retrospect, that seems unfortunate. The proliferation of one-ship companies 
occurred in direct response to the notion of "sister ship" arrest in the 1952 
Convention, and it has proved almost completely effective: any ship 
operator can avoid surrogate ship arrest if it wishes to organize its affairs to 
do so. That was already true in 1988, when Australia signed on to a 1952-
style regime. The failure of the 1999 Arrest Convention to solve the problem 
internationally by adopting a South African-style "associated ship" 
procedure was disappointing, to say the least, and it seems likely to doom 
the Convention to those dusty shelves at UNCTAD and IMO where 
unwanted conventions live out a sad but unwanted existence. However, the 
very fact that UNCTAD and IMO gave serious consideration to 
internationationaHzing the South Africa model in the 1999 Convention 
shows that world opinion has moved on since 1952 and 1986 ... so there 
are some Australian reformers ready for change.' 
160 See Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 549 at 567. Rogers AJA in the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal observed that 'there is no common, unifying principle, which 
underlies the occasional decision of courts to pierce the corporate veil', and that 'there is no 
~rincipled approach to be derived from the authorities'. 
61 Glover P 'Sister Ship Arrest and the Application of the doctrine of attachment in Australia: A 
jurisdictional comparative analysis in the wake of the 1952 Arrest Convention' (2008) 22 
Australia (3nd New Zealand Maritime Law Journal at. 
162 1bid. 
163 Davis op cit (n119) 11 
IV Conclusion 
The review undertaken in this chapter indicates that there is reluctance in 
international jurisdictions to adopt provisions similar to the associated ship 
provisions contained in the Act. 
66 
Although it is not clear what is meant by 'unconscionable act' in the 
Companies Act, I submit that it is clear that the statutory allowance for the 
piercing of the veil is only ever intended to be available in instances of 'nefarious 
conduct' and not as a matter of course, as is the case with the associated ship 
provisions outlined in the Act. I submit that the above test could be used to 
determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced even in the maritime 
context where the claimant seeks to allege the separate corporate personality is 
being used to evade the law or to frustrate its enforcement.164 
164 See Prest v Petrodel [2013] UKSC 34 at para 28, where is was stated: '[Tlhere is a limited 
principle of English law which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation or 
liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose 
enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The court 
may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the 
company or its controller of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the 
company's separate legal personality.' 
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
Wallis JA remarks in a recent decision, Owners of the MV Silver Star v Hilane 
Limited ('Hi/ane'),165 in relation to an attack on the constitutionality of the 
associated ship provisions as follows: 
'Elsewhere, and in a different capacity, 1 nave expressed the view that such 
a challenge could be raised but should not succeed. 166 As we are not 
confronted in this case with a constitutional challenge to the institution of the 
associated ship it is unnecessary for me to address the correctness of those 
academic views, which, after proper argument on an appropriate occasion, I 
may have to recant or modify.' 167 (Emphasis added.) 
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It is clear that any determination of the constitutionality of section 3(7)(a)(ii) 
read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 105 of 
1983 will requ ire the Court to balance competing interests. This balancing act 
will take place in the context of the property rights contained in section 25(1) of 
the Constitution. 
In exploring whether or not section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of 
the Act contravenes section 25(1) of the Constitution, I analysed two leading 
Constitutional Court decisions, namely the FNB and Mkontwana decisions. The 
structure of the Court's analysis of the issue was used as a framework for 
considering the relevant issues. In this dissertation I argued that depending on 
which reasoning one chooses to adopt- either that proposed in FNB or that in 
Mkontwana - one is able to develop arguments both in favour of and against the 
constitutionality of section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act. The 
elements of the tests that appear to create little controversy in the context of the 
associated ship provisions relate to whether there is 'property' that could be said 
to enjoy constitutional protection, whether there is in fact a deprivation of the 
property through the provisions of the Act and whether the Act is a law of 
165 (2014] ZASCA 194. 
166 See Wallis op cit (n1) 268- 281. 
167 Mediterranean Shipping Co SA v Cape Town Iron and Steel Works 2011 (2) SA 547 (KZD} 
para 19. 
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general application. These issues were considered in chapters 1-4 of the 
dissertation. I argued that shares in a company could be considered 'property' 
for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. In chapter 4 and 5 of the 
dissertation, on the basis of the Court's rulings in FNB and Mkontwana, I 
demonstrated why the application of the relevant provisions of the Act could be 
considered to result in a 'deprivation of property' as contemplated in the 
Constitution. I also affirmed that the Act could be considered to be a law of 
general application. The difference in the outcome of the enquiry into 
constitutionality in the context of this dissertation is based on how one responds 
to the question 'Is the there a sufficient reason for the deprivation?' I submit 
that the answer to this depends predominantly on whether one can 
demonstrate a nexus. 
In closing I submit that proprietary interests, like other property rights, are 
worthy of constitutional protection. The associated ship provisions in the Act are 
not immune to the Constitution and must pass constitutional muster. If one 
applied the Court's reasoning in Mkontwana to the enquiry, an argument could 
be made that the provisions of the Act do not infringe the provisions of section 
25(1) of the Constitution. The basis for this argument is that the provisions of 
the Act are not only legitimate but also compelling. They confer a valuable right 
on creditors seeking to secure their claims, particularly iri the context of maritime 
trade, where it is common that the defendants are outside the country and have 
no assets within South Africa apart from the vessels that may occasionally 
navigate our waters. These provisions have been specifically designed to deal 
with entities that seek to avoid liability by creating complex company structures 
where a single holding company owns numerous 'one-ship' companies. They 
are necessary to secure legitimate governmental objectives where there is a 
sufficiently strong link between the minority shareholder and the concerned 
company. The nature and extent of the deprivation is not intrusive because it 
relates to the proprietary interest of the value of the shares in the ship (whose 
value could in any event be subject to fluctuation). The deprivation is temporary 
because security could be furnished to release the ship from arrest. The nexus 
between the majority and minority shareholder is evident through t'leir joint 
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shareholding in the ship. In any event, minority shareholders assume risk by 
virtue of being minority shareholders. A prudent minority shareholder would put 
in place the relevant mechanisms to protect themselves from this potential 
eventuality. Therefore by applying the 'thin test' for rationality it could be argued 
that it is justifiable that the minority shareholder be deprived of their property in 
such circumstances. 
However, having considered all the relevant arguments, I am persuaded 
that section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act affects minority 
shareholders' property rights in a manner that is neither reasonable nor 
justifiable because it permits the deprivation of minority shareholders' property 
rights in circumstances where the minority shareholders have a remote 
connection with the transaction giving rise to the concerned ship's liability. The 
basis of the nexus that is established in the Mkontwana case cannot be applied 
to the associated ship provisions because in this instance, the associated ship is 
a separate juristic entity. It is possible that the ship, which is an asset in a ship-
owning company, could have no connection to the concerned ship's debt (save 
to the extent of the connection between the common controlling majority 
shareholders). The current provisions in the Act, which predate the 
constitutional dispensation, render the presence of the minority shareholder 
irrelevant in their reach and attack. 
While the objectives of Act are legitimate, given their impact on minority 
shareholders the relevant provisions of the Act undermine the 'perfectly 
legitimate use of the corporate form to limit risk in commercial undertakings 
generally and in shipping particularly' .168 The effect of the deprivation of the 
property rights of minority shareholders is disproportionate to the good achieved 
by the legislated infringement of such rights. Through my analysis of the position 
in international jurisdictions, it is apparent that although the current provisions of 
the Arrest Convention have proved to be ineffective, other jurisdictions have not 
extended their admiralty jurisdiction as far as South Africa has through the 
introduction of these provisions. Even the United Kingdom, which has been an 
168 Bradfield op cit (n21) 240. 
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supporter of adopting provisions similar to those contained in the Act indicated 
that they did 'not intend to catch ... other investors with minority share ownership 
but no element of effective control through the provisions. 
Whether section 3(7)(a)(ii) read with section 3(7)(b)(i) of the Act will survive 
constitutional scrutiny is a matter that will no doubt be determined by our courts 
in the near future. It will be dependent on a number of factors, which may be 
influenced by inter alia the following considerations: whether the Court chooses 
to adopt a 'thin' or 'thick' level of scrutiny in applying the substantive elements of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution; the complexity of relationships between (a) the 
concerned ship-owning company and the associated ship-owning company, (b) 
the relationship between the debt and the minority shareholder, and (c) the 
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